Here's one really simplistic way of describing government. The government makes laws, people have to follow them. Now, we can sort different types of governments by answering the question, "Who makes the laws?"
In a dictatorship, you have one person making the laws. In a pure democracy, every member of the state has a say in making the laws. Dictatorships can be quite efficient. One guy makes the laws, no one else gets a say. If the dictator wanted to make a law that Friday would be no pants day, then bam, it's done. No need to wait for anything to make the law official. Democracies, on the hand, are quite inefficient. Sometimes it takes a while to get consensus on a potential law. Lots of candidate laws never see the light of day. If there were an omniscient, morally perfect leader, then a dictatorship would be the best form of government. Unfortunately, no such individual exists. So, democracy, inefficient as it is, works out better than a dictatorship, since it allows people to decide for themselves what is best for them. Dictators can and do often act in a way that benefits themselves at the expense of the other members of the state.
Another reason to think that dictatorships are no good as a form of government is that it is possible to manipulate the dictator to make laws that may not be beneficial to everyone. Let's say you and your family were members of a dictator state. If you wanted a law that made it easy for your family to get high-paying jobs, then you'd have to go through dictator, since the dictator makes all of the laws alone. You could get the dictator to make such a law via some form of manipulation, e.g. bribery, blackmail, false information, etc. A dictator who is corruptible, ignorant, or unreasonable would be susceptible to various forms of manipulation, and could thus instate laws that are harmful to the majority of citizens.
We would thus think that democracy is better because it's harder to manipulate a bunch of people than it is to manipulate one person. All things held equal, this is true. Even though it may be relatively harder to manipulate a bunch of people, it is still certainly possible to do such manipulating with all of the mass media technology that we possess currently.
That's one reason to think that pure democracy is an inferior form of government to what I call democratic epistocracy. An epistocracy is a state run by those who meet some minimal standard of rational aptitude and being informed. John Stuart Mill championed a form of epistocracy where the number of votes you had varied positively with the degree to which you were informed and the degree to which you were capable of reasoning. This is democratic epistocracy in a nutshell. All citizens get a vote, but those in the know and are capable of thinking things through get more votes.
I think that democratic epistocracy is less susceptible to manipulation than pure democracy. Like pure democracy, you have to deal with the prospect of trying to manipulate a group of people rather than one person. Unlike pure democracy, those with the most say in what laws get enacted are less likely to manipulated via misinformation, appeals to sentiment, and bad reasoning. Of course, such individuals are not incorruptible, but at least they are not easily led astray by soundbites and such. This added resistance to manipulation is one reason to favor democratic epistocracy over pure democracy.
Friday, May 30, 2014
Tuesday, May 13, 2014
How stories are told
How many different ways are there to tell a story? We can go more or less chronologically.
1. Oral Storytelling
I'd imagine that stories were told orally first. People would gather around and the tribe shaman or other storyteller would spin a yarn. So you have storytelling via oral transmission.
Physical communication involves more than just speaking, though. There is body language. How a storyteller gesticulates plays a major role in the conveyance and quality of storytelling. Can you tell a story with just the body language? Sure. There is pantomime. Mime artists have been around for a while. There is also dance, which I'll get to below.
One major development in oral storytelling is theater. Instead of one guy narrating the tale, you have a group of individuals all acting out a narrative by playing their roles. In addition to acting, which includes speaking and body language, we have the inclusion of artifacts in the form of sets and props. Perhaps ancient storytellers used props, but this notion goes to the next level in theater.
2. Pictures
People started drawing pictures in caves a long time ago. What was the point of painting in caves? At what point in history did people draw pictures to tell stories? Of course you have different ways of drawing pictures:
A. Drawing and painting. This is includes stuff like oil, watercolor, acrylic, graphite, ink, spray paint, etc. Basically drawing and painting is any attempt at producing some kind of image on a flat surface.
B. Sculpture. As opposed to drawing and painting, sculpture is any attempt at creating a three dimensional image. Like drawing and painting, there are lots of media here. Do people use sculptures to tell stories? Probably.
C. Photography. The most recent development would be the production of images through technology and light. Normally photography might be sorted with drawing and painting, since it is a production of an image on a two dimensional surface, but it may also be considered its own sub-category, what with the advent of three dimensional printing.
D. The Moving Image. As technology advances, we go from the ability to portray a static image to that of a moving image. Basically, there are three types of moving images.
i. Film. Film is the moving image counterpart to photography. Older film is just a series of photographs shown in rapid succession. Newer film incorporates digital technologies to capture moving images.
ii. Animation. Animation is the moving image produced by either drawing, painting, or sculpture. Like older film, older animation incorporated a series of drawn images shown in rapid succession.
iii. Puppetry. Puppetry is basically an animated version of sculpture. Three dimensional images are manipulated so as to gesture and to communicate in ways similar to body language.
Film and animation are often presented in either of the two formats: Feature film or serial. Serials include both television, as well as internet series.
The thing that binds these sub-categories is the production of a static image. Can a static image tell a story? Maybe. They do say a picture is worth a thousand words. Can those thousand words comprise a coherent narrative?
3. Music
Like pictures, music has been with us for a long time. People typically associate music with songs, and I'll get to that in a bit, but let's consider music without any accompanying lyrics. Do people use music by itself to tell a story? Probably. But, like pictures, it can be hard to see how music itself can communicate a detailed narrative.
There are lots of ways of categorizing music. A lot of those categories, however, are combinations of music and other forms, such as dance or poetry. Even when we consider music by itself, there are lots of categories. Do these categories make a difference when it comes to music as a medium for communicating narrative? I'm not sure. Does it make a difference if you're telling a story through a concerto as opposed to a symphony?
4. Written Storytelling
A major milestone in storytelling was the development of the written word. Stories can now be told without a storyteller physically present. Written storytelling comes in a variety of forms.
A. Poetry. I think epic poetry is one of the oldest, if not the oldest, written form of storytelling.
B. The novel.
C. The short story.
D. The serial
5. Hybrids
There are lots of combinations of the four media mentioned above. Theater often includes accompanying music. Film can be seen as recorded theater that isn't bound by live performance or a particular stage. Here are some more examples that I could think of.
A. Songs. Combining music with written storytelling is a natural move that goes ways back.
B. Opera. Here we have a combination of music, poetry, and theater.
C. Musical Theater. Like opera, except people don't sing all the time.
D. Illustrations. Lots of novels and other forms of written storytelling have been supplemented with images, either to enhance the written narrative, or to make its own unique contribution to the story.
E. Graphic novels. The notion of the picture making its own narrative contribution goes to the next level with graphic novels, a relatively recent form of written narrative. Comic books are a combination of written and pictorial storytelling.
F. Dance. Dance is a combination of music and oral storytelling in the particular form of body language. There are as many dances as there are unique cultures.
G. Ballet. A combination of dance and theater.
H. Video games. Video games are a form of animation where the audience participates in the narrative.
There are probably lots of other formats out there that I've neglected to mention. Although I enjoy categorizing things, there is a point to this post aside from mere taxonomy. Here's the question: How do different forms of communicating narrative compare to each other? Are some inherently better than others? Is it all apples and oranges? You'll often hear people say that the book was better than the movie. Is this true? If so, why? What are the essential elements of communicating a good story? Do some formats meet these requirements better than others?
1. Oral Storytelling
I'd imagine that stories were told orally first. People would gather around and the tribe shaman or other storyteller would spin a yarn. So you have storytelling via oral transmission.
Physical communication involves more than just speaking, though. There is body language. How a storyteller gesticulates plays a major role in the conveyance and quality of storytelling. Can you tell a story with just the body language? Sure. There is pantomime. Mime artists have been around for a while. There is also dance, which I'll get to below.
One major development in oral storytelling is theater. Instead of one guy narrating the tale, you have a group of individuals all acting out a narrative by playing their roles. In addition to acting, which includes speaking and body language, we have the inclusion of artifacts in the form of sets and props. Perhaps ancient storytellers used props, but this notion goes to the next level in theater.
2. Pictures
People started drawing pictures in caves a long time ago. What was the point of painting in caves? At what point in history did people draw pictures to tell stories? Of course you have different ways of drawing pictures:
A. Drawing and painting. This is includes stuff like oil, watercolor, acrylic, graphite, ink, spray paint, etc. Basically drawing and painting is any attempt at producing some kind of image on a flat surface.
B. Sculpture. As opposed to drawing and painting, sculpture is any attempt at creating a three dimensional image. Like drawing and painting, there are lots of media here. Do people use sculptures to tell stories? Probably.
C. Photography. The most recent development would be the production of images through technology and light. Normally photography might be sorted with drawing and painting, since it is a production of an image on a two dimensional surface, but it may also be considered its own sub-category, what with the advent of three dimensional printing.
D. The Moving Image. As technology advances, we go from the ability to portray a static image to that of a moving image. Basically, there are three types of moving images.
i. Film. Film is the moving image counterpart to photography. Older film is just a series of photographs shown in rapid succession. Newer film incorporates digital technologies to capture moving images.
ii. Animation. Animation is the moving image produced by either drawing, painting, or sculpture. Like older film, older animation incorporated a series of drawn images shown in rapid succession.
iii. Puppetry. Puppetry is basically an animated version of sculpture. Three dimensional images are manipulated so as to gesture and to communicate in ways similar to body language.
Film and animation are often presented in either of the two formats: Feature film or serial. Serials include both television, as well as internet series.
The thing that binds these sub-categories is the production of a static image. Can a static image tell a story? Maybe. They do say a picture is worth a thousand words. Can those thousand words comprise a coherent narrative?
3. Music
Like pictures, music has been with us for a long time. People typically associate music with songs, and I'll get to that in a bit, but let's consider music without any accompanying lyrics. Do people use music by itself to tell a story? Probably. But, like pictures, it can be hard to see how music itself can communicate a detailed narrative.
There are lots of ways of categorizing music. A lot of those categories, however, are combinations of music and other forms, such as dance or poetry. Even when we consider music by itself, there are lots of categories. Do these categories make a difference when it comes to music as a medium for communicating narrative? I'm not sure. Does it make a difference if you're telling a story through a concerto as opposed to a symphony?
4. Written Storytelling
A major milestone in storytelling was the development of the written word. Stories can now be told without a storyteller physically present. Written storytelling comes in a variety of forms.
A. Poetry. I think epic poetry is one of the oldest, if not the oldest, written form of storytelling.
B. The novel.
C. The short story.
D. The serial
5. Hybrids
There are lots of combinations of the four media mentioned above. Theater often includes accompanying music. Film can be seen as recorded theater that isn't bound by live performance or a particular stage. Here are some more examples that I could think of.
A. Songs. Combining music with written storytelling is a natural move that goes ways back.
B. Opera. Here we have a combination of music, poetry, and theater.
C. Musical Theater. Like opera, except people don't sing all the time.
D. Illustrations. Lots of novels and other forms of written storytelling have been supplemented with images, either to enhance the written narrative, or to make its own unique contribution to the story.
E. Graphic novels. The notion of the picture making its own narrative contribution goes to the next level with graphic novels, a relatively recent form of written narrative. Comic books are a combination of written and pictorial storytelling.
F. Dance. Dance is a combination of music and oral storytelling in the particular form of body language. There are as many dances as there are unique cultures.
G. Ballet. A combination of dance and theater.
H. Video games. Video games are a form of animation where the audience participates in the narrative.
There are probably lots of other formats out there that I've neglected to mention. Although I enjoy categorizing things, there is a point to this post aside from mere taxonomy. Here's the question: How do different forms of communicating narrative compare to each other? Are some inherently better than others? Is it all apples and oranges? You'll often hear people say that the book was better than the movie. Is this true? If so, why? What are the essential elements of communicating a good story? Do some formats meet these requirements better than others?
Thursday, May 8, 2014
Communication, Technology, and Culture
Let's start with communication itself. There are two parts to communication: the content of what is being communicated, and the medium through which communication occurs. Technology obviously has a direct effect on communication media. This is what I'll focus on here. I'll also speculate on the relationship between technology and communicated content. Finally, I'll also wonder aloud about the relationship between changes in communication brought about by technology and culture.
Assuming there is no such thing as telepathy, communication is always mediated by the five physical senses. Although it is certainly possible to communicate to some extent via taste, smell, and touch, communication is most commonly received via sight and hearing. It is through sight and hearing that we communicate propositions, i.e. pieces of information that report facts and states of affairs. Taste, touch, and smell, aren't so efficient at receiving these kinds of information, with the exception of the use of braille. The aforementioned senses are more of the evocative variety. They bring to mind certain kinds of experiences, but these experiences tend to be highly subjective. Communication received via sight and hearing in the form of written and spoken language allow for some intersubjectivity between the participants of communication.
So, I'll be focusing on communication via language. As mentioned above, language is employed either in either written or spoken form. There are ways in which technology can affect the way in which language is transmitted.
Oral Language
Spoken language is constrained by the ability of the audience to hear the message. Without technology, the speaker's audience is limited to those within earshot. Technology can alleviate this constraint in a few ways. First, it can amplify the volume of the spoken message so that the message is intelligible at further distances. Examples include megaphones and public address systems. Second, it can convert a spoken message to something else, transmit it, and reconvert it back to a spoken message available to any audience anywhere who possesses to the means to reconvert that message. Examples include, radio, television, telephones, internet, etc. With the advent of recording, a spoken message can reach anyone potentially anywhere at any time.
One effect that technology has on spoken language is that it separates the message from the physical interaction that usually comes with it. Typically, a spoken message is given with the speaker and audience physically present. With technology, neither party is required to by physically present when the message is given. How does this affect culture?
Written Language
Of course, the fact that a message can reach an audience that is separated from the speaker by time and place has already been established by written language. The advent of written language ushered in major changes in culture. Messages can now be preserved across time and distributed across distant geographic locations. How did this affect culture?
With respect to the written word, technology has different effect than it does with the spoken word. Primitive ways of creating the written word were slow, costly, and difficult to distribute. Think of messages engraved into stone. As technology advances, these effects were ameliorated. Paper made messages easier to distribute. The printing press significantly lowered the cost of distribution. Typewriters sped up the process of creating written messages. How has this affected culture? Are there significant ways in which culture differs because written messages can be created and distributed quickly and cheaply?
Assuming there is no such thing as telepathy, communication is always mediated by the five physical senses. Although it is certainly possible to communicate to some extent via taste, smell, and touch, communication is most commonly received via sight and hearing. It is through sight and hearing that we communicate propositions, i.e. pieces of information that report facts and states of affairs. Taste, touch, and smell, aren't so efficient at receiving these kinds of information, with the exception of the use of braille. The aforementioned senses are more of the evocative variety. They bring to mind certain kinds of experiences, but these experiences tend to be highly subjective. Communication received via sight and hearing in the form of written and spoken language allow for some intersubjectivity between the participants of communication.
So, I'll be focusing on communication via language. As mentioned above, language is employed either in either written or spoken form. There are ways in which technology can affect the way in which language is transmitted.
Oral Language
Spoken language is constrained by the ability of the audience to hear the message. Without technology, the speaker's audience is limited to those within earshot. Technology can alleviate this constraint in a few ways. First, it can amplify the volume of the spoken message so that the message is intelligible at further distances. Examples include megaphones and public address systems. Second, it can convert a spoken message to something else, transmit it, and reconvert it back to a spoken message available to any audience anywhere who possesses to the means to reconvert that message. Examples include, radio, television, telephones, internet, etc. With the advent of recording, a spoken message can reach anyone potentially anywhere at any time.
One effect that technology has on spoken language is that it separates the message from the physical interaction that usually comes with it. Typically, a spoken message is given with the speaker and audience physically present. With technology, neither party is required to by physically present when the message is given. How does this affect culture?
Written Language
Of course, the fact that a message can reach an audience that is separated from the speaker by time and place has already been established by written language. The advent of written language ushered in major changes in culture. Messages can now be preserved across time and distributed across distant geographic locations. How did this affect culture?
With respect to the written word, technology has different effect than it does with the spoken word. Primitive ways of creating the written word were slow, costly, and difficult to distribute. Think of messages engraved into stone. As technology advances, these effects were ameliorated. Paper made messages easier to distribute. The printing press significantly lowered the cost of distribution. Typewriters sped up the process of creating written messages. How has this affected culture? Are there significant ways in which culture differs because written messages can be created and distributed quickly and cheaply?
Tuesday, April 22, 2014
The most convincing argument for the existence of God
This is a follow up to my previous post regarding an argument against the existence of a Christian God. It should be obvious that by "convincing," I mean convincing to me. Anyways, here's the argument.
1. Human beings are fundamentally different from all observed entities in the physical universe.
2. If human beings are fundamentally different from all observed entities in the physical universe, then their origins cannot be completely explained by appeals to the physical universe.
3. Therefore, the origins of human beings cannot be completely explained by appeals to the physical universe.
Of course, this argument does not show that a Christian God exists. It doesn't even conclude that any kind of God exists. It does, however, present a first step towards establishing that God exists. At the very least, it shows that there is something other than the physical universe out there.
I would imagine that most people would reject the first premise of the argument. Here's another argument given in support of the first premise.
1. Human beings experience transcendental emotions.
2. The fact that human beings experience transcendental emotions is best explained by the notion that human beings are fundamentally different from all observed entities in the physical universe.
3. Therefore, it is likely that human beings are fundamentally different from all observed entities in the physical universe.
Transcendental emotions are emotions whose scope is greater than regular social contexts. We experience hope, despair, gratitude, and anxiety at a mundane level. But we also experience these emotions at a far greater level. When someone feels thankful to be alive, who are they thanking? When someone despairs at possibility of life's meaninglessness, where is the emotion directed towards? These sorts of emotions are data that require explanation. Reductive accounts appealing to evolutionary mechanisms seem unsatisfying to me. So, absent other candidates, the best explanation seems to be that sorts of emotions come from a part of human beings that isn't formed by physical mechanisms.
1. Human beings are fundamentally different from all observed entities in the physical universe.
2. If human beings are fundamentally different from all observed entities in the physical universe, then their origins cannot be completely explained by appeals to the physical universe.
3. Therefore, the origins of human beings cannot be completely explained by appeals to the physical universe.
Of course, this argument does not show that a Christian God exists. It doesn't even conclude that any kind of God exists. It does, however, present a first step towards establishing that God exists. At the very least, it shows that there is something other than the physical universe out there.
I would imagine that most people would reject the first premise of the argument. Here's another argument given in support of the first premise.
1. Human beings experience transcendental emotions.
2. The fact that human beings experience transcendental emotions is best explained by the notion that human beings are fundamentally different from all observed entities in the physical universe.
3. Therefore, it is likely that human beings are fundamentally different from all observed entities in the physical universe.
Transcendental emotions are emotions whose scope is greater than regular social contexts. We experience hope, despair, gratitude, and anxiety at a mundane level. But we also experience these emotions at a far greater level. When someone feels thankful to be alive, who are they thanking? When someone despairs at possibility of life's meaninglessness, where is the emotion directed towards? These sorts of emotions are data that require explanation. Reductive accounts appealing to evolutionary mechanisms seem unsatisfying to me. So, absent other candidates, the best explanation seems to be that sorts of emotions come from a part of human beings that isn't formed by physical mechanisms.
Friday, April 18, 2014
Summary of the third chapter of my dissertation
The Project
I will explore and flesh out in further detail the epistemic connections between metaphysics and science. By "epistemic connection," I mean the following sorts of relations:
x epistemically justifies, or raises the justification of y.
x defeats justification for, or lowers the justification for y.
If you replace x and y with propositions commonly associated with science and metaphysics, then under what conditions will the above propositions be true or false? I will develop an account that clarifies this epistemic relationship between science and metaphysics. I will show when, if ever, propositions in science appropriately raise or lower the epistemic justification of beliefs in propositions in metaphysics, and also vice versa.
The Motivation
Imagine the hottest nightclub in town, i.e. the kind of long lines, velvet ropes, beefcake bouncers, and $20 Cosmopolitans. Let's call this place "Club Knowledge." Now, suppose we have a fellow named "Metaphysics." Metaphysics, with his faux hawk, popped collars, and Affliction jeans, has been trying to get into Club Knowledge for months now. People have hotly debated whether or not Metaphysics should be admitted to Club Knowledge. Now suppose we have a lady named Science. Science is queen of Club Knowledge. She is admitted immediately to her own VIP area and rolls with her entourage of sycophants. Metaphysics thinks to himself, "Maybe I can friendly with Science, and she'll put me on the guest list." Will this plan work? Will Science include Metaphysics in her ever growing entourage? Will Metaphysics have to do anything or make any changes in order to gain the favor of Science? Does Metaphysics even need Science to get in the club? What happens if Science disses Metaphysics? Stay tuned for more!
The Plan
Here's how the paper breaks down.
First, I'll clarify what I mean about the lowering and raising of epistemic justification. In formal epistemology, you might hear talk of credence. Credence is more or less the strength of belief that an agent has with respect to a proposition p. Credence takes on values from 0 to 1, where 0 is certainty that p is false, 1 is certainty that p is true, and 0.5 is agnosticism about p. You might think of epistemic justification as a sort of "normative" credence, i.e. the degree of credence that you should have given the justifiers present. My interest here is in determining which sorts of propositions serve as appropriate justifiers for a particular belief, and why. Armed with this knowledge, I'll move on to talk about science and metaphysics.
Once I've clarified the mechanics behind changes in epistemic justification in light of the evidence, I'll next clarify on the notions of science and metaphysics. The goal here is to more or less determine which propositions fall under science, which fall under metaphysics, and why these sorts of propositions are categorized the way they are. How does the subject matter of science relate to the subject matter of metaphysics? There are several possibilities here. The two subjects could be disjoint. One could be subsumed in the other. They might overlap to some degree, or they might be coextensive. What's the correct way to view the relationship between the subject of these two disciplines and why? Understanding the relationship between subject matter will help us further understand how the two are epistemically related. For instance, if the two are disjoint, that might go some way to explaining why there is little to no epistemic relation between the two.
Apart from subject matter, academic disciplines can also be differentiated by their methodology. What is the methodology of science and of metaphysics? How are they related? Like subject matter, the methodology of these two disciplines will help to shed light on the epistemic connections between these two disciplines. For instance, if the methodology science was completely empirical, and if the methodology of metaphysics was completely a priori, then it would seem that there is no epistemic connection between the two. Clearly things aren't actually so cut and dry, so further exploration will be needed.
Now that I've got my all my conceptual pieces, it's time to put them together to form a coherent theory about how claims in science are epistemically related to claims in metaphysics, and vice versa. This section will lean heavily on the work that I've done clarifying the concepts that are mentioned above. What I hope to show is that if there are connections between science and metaphysics, what precisely those connections are how they work, given my understanding of the above concepts. I hope to clear up some confusion and to clean up some ambiguities in current discussion involving the two disciplines. I'll also do some case studies. One popular example of the purported connection between science and metaphysics is the special theory of relativity in physics and presentism in metaphysics. Does the former defeat justification for the latter? If so, how? Armed with the theory given in this paper, we'll see what's really going in these sorts of discussions.
The Context
This paper will be a chapter in my dissertation, which is about the epistemology of metaphysics. Of course, I'll be trying to get as much mileage out of this paper as possible, and thus preparing it for conference presentation and hopefully publication.
I will explore and flesh out in further detail the epistemic connections between metaphysics and science. By "epistemic connection," I mean the following sorts of relations:
x epistemically justifies, or raises the justification of y.
x defeats justification for, or lowers the justification for y.
If you replace x and y with propositions commonly associated with science and metaphysics, then under what conditions will the above propositions be true or false? I will develop an account that clarifies this epistemic relationship between science and metaphysics. I will show when, if ever, propositions in science appropriately raise or lower the epistemic justification of beliefs in propositions in metaphysics, and also vice versa.
The Motivation
Imagine the hottest nightclub in town, i.e. the kind of long lines, velvet ropes, beefcake bouncers, and $20 Cosmopolitans. Let's call this place "Club Knowledge." Now, suppose we have a fellow named "Metaphysics." Metaphysics, with his faux hawk, popped collars, and Affliction jeans, has been trying to get into Club Knowledge for months now. People have hotly debated whether or not Metaphysics should be admitted to Club Knowledge. Now suppose we have a lady named Science. Science is queen of Club Knowledge. She is admitted immediately to her own VIP area and rolls with her entourage of sycophants. Metaphysics thinks to himself, "Maybe I can friendly with Science, and she'll put me on the guest list." Will this plan work? Will Science include Metaphysics in her ever growing entourage? Will Metaphysics have to do anything or make any changes in order to gain the favor of Science? Does Metaphysics even need Science to get in the club? What happens if Science disses Metaphysics? Stay tuned for more!
The Plan
Here's how the paper breaks down.
First, I'll clarify what I mean about the lowering and raising of epistemic justification. In formal epistemology, you might hear talk of credence. Credence is more or less the strength of belief that an agent has with respect to a proposition p. Credence takes on values from 0 to 1, where 0 is certainty that p is false, 1 is certainty that p is true, and 0.5 is agnosticism about p. You might think of epistemic justification as a sort of "normative" credence, i.e. the degree of credence that you should have given the justifiers present. My interest here is in determining which sorts of propositions serve as appropriate justifiers for a particular belief, and why. Armed with this knowledge, I'll move on to talk about science and metaphysics.
Once I've clarified the mechanics behind changes in epistemic justification in light of the evidence, I'll next clarify on the notions of science and metaphysics. The goal here is to more or less determine which propositions fall under science, which fall under metaphysics, and why these sorts of propositions are categorized the way they are. How does the subject matter of science relate to the subject matter of metaphysics? There are several possibilities here. The two subjects could be disjoint. One could be subsumed in the other. They might overlap to some degree, or they might be coextensive. What's the correct way to view the relationship between the subject of these two disciplines and why? Understanding the relationship between subject matter will help us further understand how the two are epistemically related. For instance, if the two are disjoint, that might go some way to explaining why there is little to no epistemic relation between the two.
Apart from subject matter, academic disciplines can also be differentiated by their methodology. What is the methodology of science and of metaphysics? How are they related? Like subject matter, the methodology of these two disciplines will help to shed light on the epistemic connections between these two disciplines. For instance, if the methodology science was completely empirical, and if the methodology of metaphysics was completely a priori, then it would seem that there is no epistemic connection between the two. Clearly things aren't actually so cut and dry, so further exploration will be needed.
Now that I've got my all my conceptual pieces, it's time to put them together to form a coherent theory about how claims in science are epistemically related to claims in metaphysics, and vice versa. This section will lean heavily on the work that I've done clarifying the concepts that are mentioned above. What I hope to show is that if there are connections between science and metaphysics, what precisely those connections are how they work, given my understanding of the above concepts. I hope to clear up some confusion and to clean up some ambiguities in current discussion involving the two disciplines. I'll also do some case studies. One popular example of the purported connection between science and metaphysics is the special theory of relativity in physics and presentism in metaphysics. Does the former defeat justification for the latter? If so, how? Armed with the theory given in this paper, we'll see what's really going in these sorts of discussions.
The Context
This paper will be a chapter in my dissertation, which is about the epistemology of metaphysics. Of course, I'll be trying to get as much mileage out of this paper as possible, and thus preparing it for conference presentation and hopefully publication.
Thursday, April 17, 2014
The most convincing argument against the existence of a Christian God
For me that argument goes like this:
1. If the God of Christianity exists, then sincere Christians would be significantly morally better than everyone else.
2. Sincere Christians are not significantly morally better than everyone else.
3. Therefore, the God of Christianity does not exist.
The argument itself springs from a question. If the God of Christianity exists, then why aren't Christians better people? This is of course not to say that Christians are bad people. It is to say that morally speaking, they are not noticeably different from people of other faith traditions and people of no faith at all. The spiritual transformation of individuals resulting in people who are more loving towards God and others seems to be an essential part of the Christian message. So why don't we see it?
A common response to this line of inquiry is the "user error" response. God desires for people to be more loving, but people because of their free will, disobey and remain in a state of moral mediocrity. There's some merit to this response, but it seems ultimately dissatisfying. Surely there are at least a significant minority of self-identifying Christians who sincerely desire to be more loving and to pattern their behavior after Jesus Christ. Why does it seem that most of these individuals ultimately fail to develop the kind of character that others would immediately identify as being Christlike? Second, in most Christian theology, transformation character is primarily attributed to the Holy Spirit. If this is the case, then the user error response seems misguided. If God is ultimately responsible for character transformation, and there are sincere Christians who make informed attempts at initiating this transformation, then where are the Christlike Christians? This is even more troubling if you adhere to a Reformed theology. If God has already chosen who's going to heaven, then why doesn't he go ahead and choose to make them into selflessly loving individuals?
Perhaps the second premise is false. This premise is an empirical claim. Of course, I can only speak from my own observations. I have met and am friends with many Christians who are good people. But, they really aren't noticeably more loving or charitable than people whom I've met who are atheists, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, Wiccans, etc. Perhaps someone out there can point me to some data showing Christians to be noticeably more loving than others.
Ultimately I don't think that this argument is sound. But, it's very compelling, and I don't have a good objection to it.
1. If the God of Christianity exists, then sincere Christians would be significantly morally better than everyone else.
2. Sincere Christians are not significantly morally better than everyone else.
3. Therefore, the God of Christianity does not exist.
The argument itself springs from a question. If the God of Christianity exists, then why aren't Christians better people? This is of course not to say that Christians are bad people. It is to say that morally speaking, they are not noticeably different from people of other faith traditions and people of no faith at all. The spiritual transformation of individuals resulting in people who are more loving towards God and others seems to be an essential part of the Christian message. So why don't we see it?
A common response to this line of inquiry is the "user error" response. God desires for people to be more loving, but people because of their free will, disobey and remain in a state of moral mediocrity. There's some merit to this response, but it seems ultimately dissatisfying. Surely there are at least a significant minority of self-identifying Christians who sincerely desire to be more loving and to pattern their behavior after Jesus Christ. Why does it seem that most of these individuals ultimately fail to develop the kind of character that others would immediately identify as being Christlike? Second, in most Christian theology, transformation character is primarily attributed to the Holy Spirit. If this is the case, then the user error response seems misguided. If God is ultimately responsible for character transformation, and there are sincere Christians who make informed attempts at initiating this transformation, then where are the Christlike Christians? This is even more troubling if you adhere to a Reformed theology. If God has already chosen who's going to heaven, then why doesn't he go ahead and choose to make them into selflessly loving individuals?
Perhaps the second premise is false. This premise is an empirical claim. Of course, I can only speak from my own observations. I have met and am friends with many Christians who are good people. But, they really aren't noticeably more loving or charitable than people whom I've met who are atheists, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, Wiccans, etc. Perhaps someone out there can point me to some data showing Christians to be noticeably more loving than others.
Ultimately I don't think that this argument is sound. But, it's very compelling, and I don't have a good objection to it.
My teaching statement
Below is a draft of my teaching statement. It's part of my application dossier that I'll be sending to schools when I apply for jobs.
______________________________
The Definition of Philosophy
I define philosophy very broadly as simply the study of ideas and the relations between ideas. I find this rough definition pedagogically useful, as it allows me to draw from a variety of sources, both traditional and unconventional, ordinary and esoteric, in order to illustrate philosophy at work, and to give my students different ways to practice philosophy.
The Value of Philosophy
If you are reading this, then you probably already believe that philosophy is valuable. If you do not believe that philosophy is valuable, then I probably won't convince you otherwise. I will however, give you two arguments that I give my students when I discuss the value of philosophy.
James's Dad's Argument
1. Philosophy is valuable only if it directly provides some sort of substantial material gain.
2. Philosophy does not directly provide some sort of substantial material gain.
3. Therefore, philosophy is not valuable.
James's Brother's Argument
1. Philosophy is valuable only if resolves long standing issues and debates that are part of its subject matter.
2. Philosophy has not resolved (at least not to my knowledge) such long standing issues and debates.
3. Therefore, philosophy is not valuable.
Understanding why both of these arguments are unsound goes some way into understanding the value of philosophy. Most of my students will agree that philosophy is instrumentally valuable. It strengthens the ability to participate in rational investigation, which is indispensible in just about every career field. Some of my students might even believe, as I do, that philosophy is intrinsically valuable. However, the former is sufficient to motivate the study of philosophy.
The Goal of Teaching Philosophy
My goal in teaching philosophy is to train students to become philosophers. Of course, there is distinction between philosophy as an activity and philosophy as a profession. I don't teach with the expectation that all of my students will pursue a career in philosophy, but I do teach with the expectation (or at least hope) that my students will continue to practice philosophy in some form throughout their post-college life.
I hold that what distinguishes philosophy is its method, not its subject matter. While the methods of philosophy may not be as easily codified as the scientific method, it is clear that how philosophy is done is distinct from how the sciences are done. (Whether the methods of philosophy are distinct from other humanistic disciplines is less clear.) So, when I claim that the goal of teaching philosophy is to train students to become philosophers, I mean more specifically that the goal of teaching philosophy is to train students to become proficient in a certain method of inquiry. The difference between an amateur and a professional philosopher is simply a difference of degree of mastery, similar to the difference between an amateur and professional athlete. My task as a college instructor is to train my students to attain a certain degree of proficiency in the philosophical method which they can further hone in graduate school, or apply to other career fields.
The Method of Teaching Philosophy
Now that I've stated what the goal of teaching philosophy, the question that follows is how this is to be done. As it is for all instructors, this is very much a work in progress. What I can say here is what I've tried, what seems to work, and what I'd like to try in the future.
At most universities, an Intro to Philosophy course briefly surveys topics in ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. In Syracuse, there is no such course. Instead ethics is covered in its own intro course, and there is an intro to metaphysics and epistemology course. I've taught both types of classes. I have two goals when I teach these classes: to pique their interest in philosophy, and to introduce them to an assortment of philosophical tools. I try to meet both goals by having my students apply such philosophical tools to situations that might be familiar or relevant to them. For example, one such philosophical tool is conceptual analysis. I often have my students perform conceptual analyses on ordinary concepts like sport or art.
Along with the two goals mentioned above, I also have the goal of exposing my students to well known issues in philosophy. This includes subject matter like skepticism, the existence of God, the mind-body problem, utilitarianism, ethical relativism, etc. This goal, however, is subservient to the two aforementioned goals. So, in order to pique their interest in philosophical issues, I will bring in sources to supplement primary sources. For example, science fiction movies can illustrative of the problem of skepticism in ways that are more accessible than reading Descartes' Meditations. I also use these topics as a vehicle for the introduction and application of philosophical tools. For instance, I use arguments for and against the existence of God to introduce Inference to the Best Explanation.
This approach may depart from the way many instructors teach introductory courses. Most instructors teach these classes by focusing primarily on the exegesis of primary texts. I have no problems with this method. You learn philosophy by doing philosophy. However, this seems sub-optimal to me. Consider an analogy from sports and music. One can learn to be proficient at playing the piano or playing basketball simply by learning songs or playing basketball games. But, you'd be hard-pressed to find a professional pianist or basketball player who didn't spend a considerable amount of time performing activities whose sole focus was to develop mastery of fundamental techniques. A good basketball player has likely done countless drills. Similarly, a good piano player has likely played numerous etudes.
I hold that philosophy is analogous to activities in music and sport. People can become good philosophers just by doing philosophy, but it seems that an explicit focus on philosophical method would yield even better results. I believe that the practice of doing philosophy, i.e. becoming aware of the ongoing discussions occurring among philosophers in person or in the literature and making one's own contributions to the discussion, can be supplemented with activities that sharpen fundamental techniques essential to the practice of philosophy. It seems clear that such an approach would move us closer to a more fruitful pedagogy of philosophy.
______________________________
The Definition of Philosophy
I define philosophy very broadly as simply the study of ideas and the relations between ideas. I find this rough definition pedagogically useful, as it allows me to draw from a variety of sources, both traditional and unconventional, ordinary and esoteric, in order to illustrate philosophy at work, and to give my students different ways to practice philosophy.
The Value of Philosophy
If you are reading this, then you probably already believe that philosophy is valuable. If you do not believe that philosophy is valuable, then I probably won't convince you otherwise. I will however, give you two arguments that I give my students when I discuss the value of philosophy.
James's Dad's Argument
1. Philosophy is valuable only if it directly provides some sort of substantial material gain.
2. Philosophy does not directly provide some sort of substantial material gain.
3. Therefore, philosophy is not valuable.
James's Brother's Argument
1. Philosophy is valuable only if resolves long standing issues and debates that are part of its subject matter.
2. Philosophy has not resolved (at least not to my knowledge) such long standing issues and debates.
3. Therefore, philosophy is not valuable.
Understanding why both of these arguments are unsound goes some way into understanding the value of philosophy. Most of my students will agree that philosophy is instrumentally valuable. It strengthens the ability to participate in rational investigation, which is indispensible in just about every career field. Some of my students might even believe, as I do, that philosophy is intrinsically valuable. However, the former is sufficient to motivate the study of philosophy.
The Goal of Teaching Philosophy
My goal in teaching philosophy is to train students to become philosophers. Of course, there is distinction between philosophy as an activity and philosophy as a profession. I don't teach with the expectation that all of my students will pursue a career in philosophy, but I do teach with the expectation (or at least hope) that my students will continue to practice philosophy in some form throughout their post-college life.
I hold that what distinguishes philosophy is its method, not its subject matter. While the methods of philosophy may not be as easily codified as the scientific method, it is clear that how philosophy is done is distinct from how the sciences are done. (Whether the methods of philosophy are distinct from other humanistic disciplines is less clear.) So, when I claim that the goal of teaching philosophy is to train students to become philosophers, I mean more specifically that the goal of teaching philosophy is to train students to become proficient in a certain method of inquiry. The difference between an amateur and a professional philosopher is simply a difference of degree of mastery, similar to the difference between an amateur and professional athlete. My task as a college instructor is to train my students to attain a certain degree of proficiency in the philosophical method which they can further hone in graduate school, or apply to other career fields.
The Method of Teaching Philosophy
Now that I've stated what the goal of teaching philosophy, the question that follows is how this is to be done. As it is for all instructors, this is very much a work in progress. What I can say here is what I've tried, what seems to work, and what I'd like to try in the future.
At most universities, an Intro to Philosophy course briefly surveys topics in ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. In Syracuse, there is no such course. Instead ethics is covered in its own intro course, and there is an intro to metaphysics and epistemology course. I've taught both types of classes. I have two goals when I teach these classes: to pique their interest in philosophy, and to introduce them to an assortment of philosophical tools. I try to meet both goals by having my students apply such philosophical tools to situations that might be familiar or relevant to them. For example, one such philosophical tool is conceptual analysis. I often have my students perform conceptual analyses on ordinary concepts like sport or art.
Along with the two goals mentioned above, I also have the goal of exposing my students to well known issues in philosophy. This includes subject matter like skepticism, the existence of God, the mind-body problem, utilitarianism, ethical relativism, etc. This goal, however, is subservient to the two aforementioned goals. So, in order to pique their interest in philosophical issues, I will bring in sources to supplement primary sources. For example, science fiction movies can illustrative of the problem of skepticism in ways that are more accessible than reading Descartes' Meditations. I also use these topics as a vehicle for the introduction and application of philosophical tools. For instance, I use arguments for and against the existence of God to introduce Inference to the Best Explanation.
This approach may depart from the way many instructors teach introductory courses. Most instructors teach these classes by focusing primarily on the exegesis of primary texts. I have no problems with this method. You learn philosophy by doing philosophy. However, this seems sub-optimal to me. Consider an analogy from sports and music. One can learn to be proficient at playing the piano or playing basketball simply by learning songs or playing basketball games. But, you'd be hard-pressed to find a professional pianist or basketball player who didn't spend a considerable amount of time performing activities whose sole focus was to develop mastery of fundamental techniques. A good basketball player has likely done countless drills. Similarly, a good piano player has likely played numerous etudes.
I hold that philosophy is analogous to activities in music and sport. People can become good philosophers just by doing philosophy, but it seems that an explicit focus on philosophical method would yield even better results. I believe that the practice of doing philosophy, i.e. becoming aware of the ongoing discussions occurring among philosophers in person or in the literature and making one's own contributions to the discussion, can be supplemented with activities that sharpen fundamental techniques essential to the practice of philosophy. It seems clear that such an approach would move us closer to a more fruitful pedagogy of philosophy.