One interesting thing that happened over this past year was that I gained an interest in dressing better. Around October or so, I started reading blogs on men's style. With this new found information, I had my clothes tailored to fit better, and started shopping for all kinds of different clothing items. I overhauled my entire closet. I went from wearing jeans and "witty" t-shirts to wearing ties, sport jackets, and leather brogues on a daily basis.
People who know me are predictably surprised at how I appear now. Most are supportive, and nearly all are curious as to why I decided to make this change. This is an interesting question in general. I have no good answer for them. How did I develop the interest and motivation to pursue this line of decision making? It's not like I made a conscious decision one day to change the way I dress.
This sort of thing happened to me before. I became interested in playing guitar and making music. I became interested in studying philosophy. I can't tell you why I all of a sudden became so interested in these things. They just happened to me. It's as if a railroad switch went off in my brain, redirecting my attention and effort to certain things, and away from others.
This leads me to conclude that I don't have very much control over the passions and motivations in my life. If I'm not interested in something, I can't will myself to be interested in it. Isn't the same true of romance? We can't make ourselves be attracted to someone, can we? The only explanation I have at the moment for why we are motivated in the way we are is that we are affected by a variety of external factors. Some perfect storm of external events and stimuli makes a permanent or long lasting impression on us, thus directing our attention to or away from certain sorts of things in life.
What this seems to imply is that if we want to change our interests or motivations, the best that we can do is to somehow affect external events so that we experience the combination that produces the motivation. For instance, if we want to be motivated in eating better, we cannot simply will ourselves to make the decisions associated with healthy eating. Instead, we have to expose ourselves to the sorts of circumstances that will affect our brain in such a way as to develop the motivation to eat more healthily. Of course what those circumstances are for any type of motivation is a mystery, and there is no guarantee that experiencing a particular cocktail of events will produce the right kind of motivation.
Monday, December 30, 2013
Saturday, December 28, 2013
The Purpose of Education: Part Two
In the post right before this one, I listed two different guiding principles that are commonly associated with education. First, there is education as scholarship. Second, there is education as a means to economic advantage.
My current take on education is that it's purpose is civic. Institutionalized education is supposed to train individuals to be good citizens. What counts as a good citizen in a democratic society? There are roughly three parts. First, a good citizen is informed, has beliefs about what constitutes a flourishing society, is able and willing to participate in reasoned debate with disagreeing individuals, is able to evaluate competing claims, is able to cogently articulate her views to others, and so forth. Second, a good citizen possesses the skills and the motivation to act on her ideas. This includes voting, participating in civic discourse, tasks related to her vocation, etc. Third, a good citizen has the desire and ability to act for the good of others, i.e. she has established a solid moral foundation.
This sort of view on education largely subsumes the other two views. Being an informed citizen requires that one be educated on matters of all sorts, including topics that may not be deemed "practical" for job purposes. Being an effective citizen requires that one possess the sorts of skills that largely overlap with skills that are pertinent to obtaining jobs.
Anyways, that's my brief take on the purpose of education. So where does philosophy fit in? It seems pretty obvious that philosophy plays a central role in developing the informed citizen. I tell my students that philosophy is the study of ideas. Philosophers examine the relationship between ideas and other ideas, as well as the relationship between ideas and the world the we observe, both physical and social. The philosophical method is simply the method of critical thought. If you are critically examining some claim, then you are doing philosophy. People trained in philosophy are, ideally, people equipped to critically examine options on display in the marketplace of ideas.
My current take on education is that it's purpose is civic. Institutionalized education is supposed to train individuals to be good citizens. What counts as a good citizen in a democratic society? There are roughly three parts. First, a good citizen is informed, has beliefs about what constitutes a flourishing society, is able and willing to participate in reasoned debate with disagreeing individuals, is able to evaluate competing claims, is able to cogently articulate her views to others, and so forth. Second, a good citizen possesses the skills and the motivation to act on her ideas. This includes voting, participating in civic discourse, tasks related to her vocation, etc. Third, a good citizen has the desire and ability to act for the good of others, i.e. she has established a solid moral foundation.
This sort of view on education largely subsumes the other two views. Being an informed citizen requires that one be educated on matters of all sorts, including topics that may not be deemed "practical" for job purposes. Being an effective citizen requires that one possess the sorts of skills that largely overlap with skills that are pertinent to obtaining jobs.
Anyways, that's my brief take on the purpose of education. So where does philosophy fit in? It seems pretty obvious that philosophy plays a central role in developing the informed citizen. I tell my students that philosophy is the study of ideas. Philosophers examine the relationship between ideas and other ideas, as well as the relationship between ideas and the world the we observe, both physical and social. The philosophical method is simply the method of critical thought. If you are critically examining some claim, then you are doing philosophy. People trained in philosophy are, ideally, people equipped to critically examine options on display in the marketplace of ideas.
Wednesday, December 25, 2013
The Purpose of Education
So earlier I wrote a post briefly musing on what I took education to be. This post is on what the purpose of education is supposed to be.
The kind of education I have in mind here is what I call "institutionalized education." This is the sort of education that occurs in publicly and privately funded schools from pre-kindergarten to graduate studies. Institutionalized education is typically what first comes to mind among most individuals when they consider the meaning of the term, "education."
What is the purpose and function of institutionalized education? There seem to me two general answers to the question: one is scholarly, the other is economic.
The scholarly purpose of education might be for the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake. Under this guidelines, schools would train its students to acquire new knowledge as effectively as possible. This typically entails training students in the methodologies of various fields, like the scientific method, probability/statistics, formal logic, hermeneutics, etc.
The economic purpose of education treats education as instrumental in nature. Education is the means to which one can achieve a certain socio-economic status in life. How is this so? Society has used education as a filtering mechanism for its work force. I guess the idea is that getting a degree, whether high school, college, or graduate school, is somehow supposed to indicate some kind of success in the workforce, that would be harder to attain without the degree. Education along these lines typically entails teaching methods and informational content that would considered assets in the job market.
Either purpose is fine when considered independently. The problems arise when educational institutions are charged to do both. At least at the collegiate level, institutions regard themselves as being charged with the purpose of scholarly education. However, education costs money. It costs money to build classrooms, pay teachers, and procure lab equipment or teaching tools. So, while many colleges would like to be viewed as institutions of scholarly education, economic realities often dictate that the pursue education along economic lines. People view education as the means by which individuals and families can obtain economic stability. This view influences the public funding of education, as well as the enrollment and alumni giving at private schools.
When schools view themselves as providing both scholarly and economic types of education, tensions can arise as to how to distribute limited resources. When money's tight, do you cut back on departmental budgets uniformly? Or do certain departments experience greater setbacks?
Here are a few things that I wonder about. Is it true that most colleges and universities are trending towards a more economic view of education? If so, is this a good, bad, or neutral thing? More generally, is education only instrumentally viable, or is the pursuit of knowledge valuable for its own sake? If we believe the latter, why?
The kind of education I have in mind here is what I call "institutionalized education." This is the sort of education that occurs in publicly and privately funded schools from pre-kindergarten to graduate studies. Institutionalized education is typically what first comes to mind among most individuals when they consider the meaning of the term, "education."
What is the purpose and function of institutionalized education? There seem to me two general answers to the question: one is scholarly, the other is economic.
The scholarly purpose of education might be for the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake. Under this guidelines, schools would train its students to acquire new knowledge as effectively as possible. This typically entails training students in the methodologies of various fields, like the scientific method, probability/statistics, formal logic, hermeneutics, etc.
The economic purpose of education treats education as instrumental in nature. Education is the means to which one can achieve a certain socio-economic status in life. How is this so? Society has used education as a filtering mechanism for its work force. I guess the idea is that getting a degree, whether high school, college, or graduate school, is somehow supposed to indicate some kind of success in the workforce, that would be harder to attain without the degree. Education along these lines typically entails teaching methods and informational content that would considered assets in the job market.
Either purpose is fine when considered independently. The problems arise when educational institutions are charged to do both. At least at the collegiate level, institutions regard themselves as being charged with the purpose of scholarly education. However, education costs money. It costs money to build classrooms, pay teachers, and procure lab equipment or teaching tools. So, while many colleges would like to be viewed as institutions of scholarly education, economic realities often dictate that the pursue education along economic lines. People view education as the means by which individuals and families can obtain economic stability. This view influences the public funding of education, as well as the enrollment and alumni giving at private schools.
When schools view themselves as providing both scholarly and economic types of education, tensions can arise as to how to distribute limited resources. When money's tight, do you cut back on departmental budgets uniformly? Or do certain departments experience greater setbacks?
Here are a few things that I wonder about. Is it true that most colleges and universities are trending towards a more economic view of education? If so, is this a good, bad, or neutral thing? More generally, is education only instrumentally viable, or is the pursuit of knowledge valuable for its own sake? If we believe the latter, why?
Tuesday, December 24, 2013
The Original State of Human Nature
In an earlier post, I briefly discussed my thoughts on Jared Diamond's book, Guns, Germs, and Steel. The book attempts to explain why certain societies came to dominate over others. What I found fascinating was learning how technology developed, and the role that it played in the history of nations.
Now, I'm interested in how culture is affected by technology. In order to get a better handle on this project, it's helpful to know what culture was like at the dawn of human civilization. Did individuals during this time have moral beliefs? If so, what were they? How can we even know if these individuals had moral beliefs, and if they did, what these beliefs were?
Diamond, in his new book, The World Until Yesterday, speculates on the culture of proto-societies by observing hunter-gatherer groups still present today. How much one can infer about the state of humans back in the day by observing these groups is a matter of debate. For one thing, these groups have often interacted with modern societies, thus introducing some cultural contamination.
Another possibility is to make inferences based on archaeological findings. We can look at the sort of stuff these people had and infer what might be important to them. The argument goes as follows. If people are willing to take the time and effort to make stuff, then the function of the things that they make reflect their own values. Something like that.
I don't know very much about archaeology, but I think I can make some rather general claims about the values of early man.
Early man valued survival. This much is obvious. It seems that the first stage in the development of technology was the crafting of rudimentary tools to hunt and to gather food.
Other than survival, what did early man value? How about procreation? That would be the second part of the Darwinian theoretical tag team. It's obvious that early man reproduced. It might be safe to say that reproduction was important to early man. But here there are some questions. Why not reproduction with anyone and everyone? Was early man selective in choosing their mating partners? If so, why? One standard answer might be that human infants are not like other animals in that they can hit the ground running. They require a lot of care and maintenance before they become independent. Just making babies without caring for them would result in a lot of dead babies, and a lot of wasted effort. However, caring for babies is costly. The woman caring for the baby incurs a large cost, and thus may have an incentive to be picky about who she mates with.
This might explain that it's not just reproduction that matters, but reproduction of a certain kind. It's all about the guy trying to woo the girl, and the girl trying to keep the guy after. This narrative is present in all of human history. I'll call this sort of thing, "courtship reproduction."
So, it might be safe to say that there were at least two values held by early man, survival and courtship reproduction. A few questions follow. First, were these the only values? Are all other values derivative of these two. Second, how were these values affected by the development of technology? For instance, the development of technology can make survival easier. If survival isn't as hard as it used to be, what happens then? How are human values affected?
Now, I'm interested in how culture is affected by technology. In order to get a better handle on this project, it's helpful to know what culture was like at the dawn of human civilization. Did individuals during this time have moral beliefs? If so, what were they? How can we even know if these individuals had moral beliefs, and if they did, what these beliefs were?
Diamond, in his new book, The World Until Yesterday, speculates on the culture of proto-societies by observing hunter-gatherer groups still present today. How much one can infer about the state of humans back in the day by observing these groups is a matter of debate. For one thing, these groups have often interacted with modern societies, thus introducing some cultural contamination.
Another possibility is to make inferences based on archaeological findings. We can look at the sort of stuff these people had and infer what might be important to them. The argument goes as follows. If people are willing to take the time and effort to make stuff, then the function of the things that they make reflect their own values. Something like that.
I don't know very much about archaeology, but I think I can make some rather general claims about the values of early man.
Early man valued survival. This much is obvious. It seems that the first stage in the development of technology was the crafting of rudimentary tools to hunt and to gather food.
Other than survival, what did early man value? How about procreation? That would be the second part of the Darwinian theoretical tag team. It's obvious that early man reproduced. It might be safe to say that reproduction was important to early man. But here there are some questions. Why not reproduction with anyone and everyone? Was early man selective in choosing their mating partners? If so, why? One standard answer might be that human infants are not like other animals in that they can hit the ground running. They require a lot of care and maintenance before they become independent. Just making babies without caring for them would result in a lot of dead babies, and a lot of wasted effort. However, caring for babies is costly. The woman caring for the baby incurs a large cost, and thus may have an incentive to be picky about who she mates with.
This might explain that it's not just reproduction that matters, but reproduction of a certain kind. It's all about the guy trying to woo the girl, and the girl trying to keep the guy after. This narrative is present in all of human history. I'll call this sort of thing, "courtship reproduction."
So, it might be safe to say that there were at least two values held by early man, survival and courtship reproduction. A few questions follow. First, were these the only values? Are all other values derivative of these two. Second, how were these values affected by the development of technology? For instance, the development of technology can make survival easier. If survival isn't as hard as it used to be, what happens then? How are human values affected?
Tuesday, December 10, 2013
Thinking, Fast and Slow, A Catalog of Fallacies: Part 4
Now for the fourth part of the book, and the last part of this series. This part focuses on the disparity between the image of the rational agent in classical economics and the image of the agent as observed by psychology.
Reference Point
A reference point is a context, usually quantitative, relative to which a person bases decisions involving risk. For instance, a person with $100 may be offered a bet in which she has 50% chance of winning $70, and a 50% chance of losing $70. The $100 is the reference point. People have been shown to behave differently at different reference points. Someone who has more money is less likely to be risk averse.
Endowment Effect
This describes the behavior of individuals with respect to highly prized items. Once an individual obtains a sought after item for a certain price, she is unwilling to to sell it at a price that is significantly higher than the price she bought it for. Our emotional attachment to items prevents us from behaving as rational actors in a market.
Loss Aversion
Occurs when the individual inflates the potential cost of losses. This is partly derivative of the endowment effect.
Negativity Dominance
A psychological phenomenon wherein potentially negative states loom larger in the mind than positive.
Possibility Effect
Utility increases disproportionately when the likelihood of a desired outcome goes from zero to some small positive number.
Certainty Effect
Like the possibility effect, utility increases disproportionately when the likelihood of a desired outcome goes from some high probability to 100%. We tend to overweight desired outcomes that are certain, as opposed to desired outcomes that have a high, but not certain probability of occurring.
The possibility and certainty effect also applies to losses. We tend to overweight small risks, and are willing to pay more to eliminate them altogether.
The bottom line is that improbable outcomes are overweighted, whereas certain outcomes are underweighted.
The possibility and certainty effect combine to form what Kahneman calls the "Fourfold Effect"
This model can be used explain how people behave with respect to rare events.
Disposition Effect
A bias in which an individual makes decisions based on short term gains.
Sunk Cost Fallacy
The decision to invest additional resources in a losing prospect when better investments are available.
Taboo Tradeoff
This describes the resistance individual place against any tradeoff that increases risk, even if the increase in risk is acceptable, and potential gives better yields in the long run.
Fear of losses seems to be a powerful explanatory tool in behavioral economics.
Reference Point
A reference point is a context, usually quantitative, relative to which a person bases decisions involving risk. For instance, a person with $100 may be offered a bet in which she has 50% chance of winning $70, and a 50% chance of losing $70. The $100 is the reference point. People have been shown to behave differently at different reference points. Someone who has more money is less likely to be risk averse.
Endowment Effect
This describes the behavior of individuals with respect to highly prized items. Once an individual obtains a sought after item for a certain price, she is unwilling to to sell it at a price that is significantly higher than the price she bought it for. Our emotional attachment to items prevents us from behaving as rational actors in a market.
Loss Aversion
Occurs when the individual inflates the potential cost of losses. This is partly derivative of the endowment effect.
Negativity Dominance
A psychological phenomenon wherein potentially negative states loom larger in the mind than positive.
Possibility Effect
Utility increases disproportionately when the likelihood of a desired outcome goes from zero to some small positive number.
Certainty Effect
Like the possibility effect, utility increases disproportionately when the likelihood of a desired outcome goes from some high probability to 100%. We tend to overweight desired outcomes that are certain, as opposed to desired outcomes that have a high, but not certain probability of occurring.
The possibility and certainty effect also applies to losses. We tend to overweight small risks, and are willing to pay more to eliminate them altogether.
The bottom line is that improbable outcomes are overweighted, whereas certain outcomes are underweighted.
The possibility and certainty effect combine to form what Kahneman calls the "Fourfold Effect"
This model can be used explain how people behave with respect to rare events.
Disposition Effect
A bias in which an individual makes decisions based on short term gains.
Sunk Cost Fallacy
The decision to invest additional resources in a losing prospect when better investments are available.
Taboo Tradeoff
This describes the resistance individual place against any tradeoff that increases risk, even if the increase in risk is acceptable, and potential gives better yields in the long run.
Fear of losses seems to be a powerful explanatory tool in behavioral economics.
Sunday, December 8, 2013
Thinking, Fast and Slow, A Catalog of Fallacies: Part 3
Alrighty, stuff from part three of the book. This part of the book focuses on biases that result in overconfidence about the outcome of future events.
Narrative Fallacy
This occurs when we use flawed stories to construct causal narratives of events, which we use in turn to shape our expectations of the future. Examples include Horatio Alger-style rags-to-riches stories that have us believe that hard work and indomitable character lead inevitably to success.
Hindsight Bias
When asked to reconstruct their past beliefs, people retrieve their current ones instead, and many cannot believe that they ever believed differently.
Outcome Bias
When outcomes are bad, people often blame decision-makers for not seeing what they took to be the obvious. However, the obvious only appears after the fact.
Illusion of Validity
Self-explanatory. There are processes of inference and decisions-making that have been empirically shown to be unreliable, but they still "feel" like they are valid forms of inference.
Illusion of Skill
Derivative of illusion of validity. It looks like certain jobs and positions are highly skilled, when in fact they do marginally better than decisions made by a computer algorithm.
The Inside View
The perspective taken from within an objective oriented group. This leads to the planning fallacy.
Planning Fallacy
Committed when forecasts are unrealistically close to best case scenarios.
Narrative Fallacy
This occurs when we use flawed stories to construct causal narratives of events, which we use in turn to shape our expectations of the future. Examples include Horatio Alger-style rags-to-riches stories that have us believe that hard work and indomitable character lead inevitably to success.
Hindsight Bias
When asked to reconstruct their past beliefs, people retrieve their current ones instead, and many cannot believe that they ever believed differently.
Outcome Bias
When outcomes are bad, people often blame decision-makers for not seeing what they took to be the obvious. However, the obvious only appears after the fact.
Illusion of Validity
Self-explanatory. There are processes of inference and decisions-making that have been empirically shown to be unreliable, but they still "feel" like they are valid forms of inference.
Illusion of Skill
Derivative of illusion of validity. It looks like certain jobs and positions are highly skilled, when in fact they do marginally better than decisions made by a computer algorithm.
The Inside View
The perspective taken from within an objective oriented group. This leads to the planning fallacy.
Planning Fallacy
Committed when forecasts are unrealistically close to best case scenarios.
Friday, December 6, 2013
Thinking Fast and Slow, A Catalog of Fallacies: Part 2
Okay, now on to the fallacies. In part two of the book, Kahneman goes over what he calls "Heuristics and Biases." Here's the list.
The Law of Small Numbers
People often generalize from too small a sample size. What happens is that System 1 looks for some sort of causal explanation to some phenomenon when there really is no causal explanation.
Anchoring Effect
When trying to provide some sort of numerical estimation, individuals can be primed by suggestive numbers. For instance, when asked how much someone would contribute to a charity, a suggested donation influenced their answers upwards or downwards depending on the amount suggested.
Availability Heuristic
Our beliefs about the size of a particular group or the frequency of a particular occurrence is affected by how many examples we can bring to mind of the group or appearance.
Affect Heuristic
This occurs when System 1 substitutes a question regarding fact and probability with a related question about how an individual feels emotionally about a particular claim.
Representativeness
Individuals will often use stereotypes to determine whether someone or something is a member of a particular group. They often do this while at the same time ignoring base rate probability.
Conjunction Fallacy
This occurs when someone judges that the conjunction of two events is more probably than any one of those events.
Regression to the Mean
Exceptionally good or bad performances will likely be followed by either poorer or better performances respectively. This is simply due to statistics, but people often misattribute this pattern to talent or lack thereof.
I'll cover part 3 in a later post.
The Law of Small Numbers
People often generalize from too small a sample size. What happens is that System 1 looks for some sort of causal explanation to some phenomenon when there really is no causal explanation.
Anchoring Effect
When trying to provide some sort of numerical estimation, individuals can be primed by suggestive numbers. For instance, when asked how much someone would contribute to a charity, a suggested donation influenced their answers upwards or downwards depending on the amount suggested.
Availability Heuristic
Our beliefs about the size of a particular group or the frequency of a particular occurrence is affected by how many examples we can bring to mind of the group or appearance.
Affect Heuristic
This occurs when System 1 substitutes a question regarding fact and probability with a related question about how an individual feels emotionally about a particular claim.
Representativeness
Individuals will often use stereotypes to determine whether someone or something is a member of a particular group. They often do this while at the same time ignoring base rate probability.
Conjunction Fallacy
This occurs when someone judges that the conjunction of two events is more probably than any one of those events.
Regression to the Mean
Exceptionally good or bad performances will likely be followed by either poorer or better performances respectively. This is simply due to statistics, but people often misattribute this pattern to talent or lack thereof.
I'll cover part 3 in a later post.
Thursday, December 5, 2013
Thinking Fast and Slow, A Catalog of Fallacies: Part 1
I also just recently finished reading Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow. For my convenience, I'm going to catalog all of the different sorts of biases that Kahneman observes in our decision making making process.
First, the set up. Kahneman holds that there are two aspects to the psychology of decision making. He calls them System 1 and System 2. System 1 is the fast, impulsive, intuitive aspect of decision making. System 2 is the slow, deliberative, calculative aspect of decision making. Our decision making process involves one or both of these systems, depending on all sorts of environmental and personal factors.
Okay, some tidbits about these systems.
First, System 2 expends more mental energy than System 1. Usually we're not inclined to use System 2 unless circumstances require it. System 2 is what Kahneman calls the "lazy controller." One consequence from this observation is that System 1 will make lots of decisions based on unreliable methods, and System 2 will not be called into service because the individual may believe those methods to be sound.
A major lesson here is that we often take the path of least resistance when it comes to decision making. When are more inclined to decide in favor of x if x coheres with a particular narrative that we've constructed, if x is easier to understand, if x is at the forefront of our attention, or if x is presented by an individual that we are drawn to for whatever reason. Furthermore, Kahneman notes that many of our decisions are based solely on information we have on hand, regardless of how incomplete that information might be. He calls this "what you see is all there is," WYSIATI for short.
One aspect of System 1 is that a decision made via System 1 is often affected by information received from the environment just prior to the decision. A form of this kind of effect is what Kahneman calls "priming." Priming occurs when environmental factors, regardless of how tangentially related they are, affect your cognitive state, which in turns affects your decision making process. For example, a recent marital break up can prime an employer to view job candidates differently, without his or her noticing it.
This sort of associative thinking is a big part of the System 1 process. Often we analogize decision-making factors, even when those analogies are inappropriate. For instance, we often replace the question we're given with one that seems analogous and easier to answer. If we're asked, "How much would we give to contribute to save an endangered species?" we might replace this with "How much emotion do I feel when I think of dying dolphins?"
Okay, so that's about it as far as set up goes. Fallacies next.
First, the set up. Kahneman holds that there are two aspects to the psychology of decision making. He calls them System 1 and System 2. System 1 is the fast, impulsive, intuitive aspect of decision making. System 2 is the slow, deliberative, calculative aspect of decision making. Our decision making process involves one or both of these systems, depending on all sorts of environmental and personal factors.
Okay, some tidbits about these systems.
First, System 2 expends more mental energy than System 1. Usually we're not inclined to use System 2 unless circumstances require it. System 2 is what Kahneman calls the "lazy controller." One consequence from this observation is that System 1 will make lots of decisions based on unreliable methods, and System 2 will not be called into service because the individual may believe those methods to be sound.
A major lesson here is that we often take the path of least resistance when it comes to decision making. When are more inclined to decide in favor of x if x coheres with a particular narrative that we've constructed, if x is easier to understand, if x is at the forefront of our attention, or if x is presented by an individual that we are drawn to for whatever reason. Furthermore, Kahneman notes that many of our decisions are based solely on information we have on hand, regardless of how incomplete that information might be. He calls this "what you see is all there is," WYSIATI for short.
One aspect of System 1 is that a decision made via System 1 is often affected by information received from the environment just prior to the decision. A form of this kind of effect is what Kahneman calls "priming." Priming occurs when environmental factors, regardless of how tangentially related they are, affect your cognitive state, which in turns affects your decision making process. For example, a recent marital break up can prime an employer to view job candidates differently, without his or her noticing it.
This sort of associative thinking is a big part of the System 1 process. Often we analogize decision-making factors, even when those analogies are inappropriate. For instance, we often replace the question we're given with one that seems analogous and easier to answer. If we're asked, "How much would we give to contribute to save an endangered species?" we might replace this with "How much emotion do I feel when I think of dying dolphins?"
Okay, so that's about it as far as set up goes. Fallacies next.
Tuesday, December 3, 2013
Guns, Germs, and Steel: Reflections
I recently just finished listening to the audiobook version of Guns, Germs, and Steel by Jared Diamond. It's a fascinating book fill with all kinds of tidbits and facts about anthropology. The book breaks down as follows.
We observe the following: Some nations have dominated and colonized other nations and groups in modern history.
What best explains this observation?
Diamond divides up the explanation between proximate and ultimate causes. The proximate causes, i.e. what more directly explains this fact about history is that the dominating countries had the technology, communication via writing, and political structure that provided the means by which they could colonize other lands and subjugate other societies. Moreover, the germs and diseases carried by members of dominating societies decimated those of the conquered societies. These proximate causes are what are summed up in the title "Guns, Germs, and Steel."
The ultimate causes are supposed explain why certain societies ended up with the guns, germs, and the steel. For Diamond, there is one ultimate cause: food production. Societies that settled down and mass produced food, as opposed to hunter-gatherer groups, were the ones that ended with the means to advance technology, form complex political organizations, and build immunity to certain kinds of diseases.
Much of the book goes on to explain in detail what sorts of environmental factors led certain societies to transition into agrarian food producers. It also attempts to establish the causal connections between mass food production and advancements in technology, writing, and political organization, as well as the introduction of certain diseases that proved to be fatal to other groups. The last third book consists of case studies on various groups.
Here are two thoughts about this book. First, what Diamond deems as ultimate and proximate causes give necessary conditions, but themselves don't seem jointly sufficient. Stuff like technology gives groups the ability to invade and conquer someone else's land, but technology itself doesn't compel groups to go out and take other peoples' lands. Why do people feel the need to take over other societies? Where does this motivation come from? There doesn't seem to be much in terms of explanation regarding the collective psychological of dominating societies.
This in turn leads to another thought. The desire to expand and conquer, is this desire innate? I'm of course interested in the intersection between culture and technology, so it would be good to get some idea of what culture was like at the dawn of civilization. Did early man have values? A sense of aesthetic? In general, what sorts of normative beliefs did the earliest hunter-gatherer groups share? Having some idea about this helps us to see how those beliefs might have evolved as technology progressed. This I'll save for a later post.
We observe the following: Some nations have dominated and colonized other nations and groups in modern history.
What best explains this observation?
Diamond divides up the explanation between proximate and ultimate causes. The proximate causes, i.e. what more directly explains this fact about history is that the dominating countries had the technology, communication via writing, and political structure that provided the means by which they could colonize other lands and subjugate other societies. Moreover, the germs and diseases carried by members of dominating societies decimated those of the conquered societies. These proximate causes are what are summed up in the title "Guns, Germs, and Steel."
The ultimate causes are supposed explain why certain societies ended up with the guns, germs, and the steel. For Diamond, there is one ultimate cause: food production. Societies that settled down and mass produced food, as opposed to hunter-gatherer groups, were the ones that ended with the means to advance technology, form complex political organizations, and build immunity to certain kinds of diseases.
Much of the book goes on to explain in detail what sorts of environmental factors led certain societies to transition into agrarian food producers. It also attempts to establish the causal connections between mass food production and advancements in technology, writing, and political organization, as well as the introduction of certain diseases that proved to be fatal to other groups. The last third book consists of case studies on various groups.
Here are two thoughts about this book. First, what Diamond deems as ultimate and proximate causes give necessary conditions, but themselves don't seem jointly sufficient. Stuff like technology gives groups the ability to invade and conquer someone else's land, but technology itself doesn't compel groups to go out and take other peoples' lands. Why do people feel the need to take over other societies? Where does this motivation come from? There doesn't seem to be much in terms of explanation regarding the collective psychological of dominating societies.
This in turn leads to another thought. The desire to expand and conquer, is this desire innate? I'm of course interested in the intersection between culture and technology, so it would be good to get some idea of what culture was like at the dawn of civilization. Did early man have values? A sense of aesthetic? In general, what sorts of normative beliefs did the earliest hunter-gatherer groups share? Having some idea about this helps us to see how those beliefs might have evolved as technology progressed. This I'll save for a later post.
Wednesday, November 20, 2013
My EDC Photo
"EDC" stands for "Every Day Carry." Here's my photo.
I'll go clockwise starting from my bag.
1. Fossil Emerson Messenger Bag
I found this at the mall and it was tagged at $148. The bag was on sale for a 30% discount, so that brought the price down to about $100 before tax. I find out later that the bag was mis-tagged and that the real price was $250. I don't know if there's a word for the opposite of buyer's regret, but that most certainly applies in this case. Love this bag.
Aside from what's on the table, what I keep in my bag includes books that are not available in Kindle format, pens, teaching paperwork, and occasionally my laptop. I don't generally carry my laptop unless I intend on writing somewhere other than home.
2. Sony MDR-NC200D Noise Cancelling Headphones
If I'm out and about and I want to read and/or write, these headphones are a must. I get easily distracted by the music and conversations around me.
3. Dry Erase Markers
Classrooms never seem to have dry erase markers that work, so I carry some with me just in case.
4. Keys
House keys, car keys, and a keychain bottle opener.
5. Saddleback Leather Bifold Wallet
I used to have a trifold wallet filled with all kinds of frequent customer cards, but decided to pare everything down to a slimmer bifold. I only carry incidental cash and three cards with me: driver's license, SU ID, and debit card.
6. Amazon Kindle
Carrying one e-book is clearly better than lugging around a bunch of books. The electronic ink is nice and easy on the eyes, but it can be a pain in the ass since coffee shops insist on having dim lighting.
The version I have is a bit older. I'll upgrade when e-books can allow you to flip through pages very quickly.
7. (Not Pictured) Apple iPhone 4
The beautiful thing about having a Kindle and a smartphone is that I always have access to information. That means that I can take advantage of time that would normally be wasted. I can read while waiting for an appointment, or waiting in line, or in between classes. With a smartphone, I can do this without carrying anything else. I have Kindle, Dropbox, and Feedly on my phone, so I have access to all of my books, journal articles, and RSS feed.
I'm currently due for an upgrade, but I haven't decided if I want to stick with Apple or switch to an Android phone like the Samsung Galaxy.
I'll go clockwise starting from my bag.
1. Fossil Emerson Messenger Bag
I found this at the mall and it was tagged at $148. The bag was on sale for a 30% discount, so that brought the price down to about $100 before tax. I find out later that the bag was mis-tagged and that the real price was $250. I don't know if there's a word for the opposite of buyer's regret, but that most certainly applies in this case. Love this bag.
Aside from what's on the table, what I keep in my bag includes books that are not available in Kindle format, pens, teaching paperwork, and occasionally my laptop. I don't generally carry my laptop unless I intend on writing somewhere other than home.
2. Sony MDR-NC200D Noise Cancelling Headphones
If I'm out and about and I want to read and/or write, these headphones are a must. I get easily distracted by the music and conversations around me.
3. Dry Erase Markers
Classrooms never seem to have dry erase markers that work, so I carry some with me just in case.
4. Keys
House keys, car keys, and a keychain bottle opener.
5. Saddleback Leather Bifold Wallet
I used to have a trifold wallet filled with all kinds of frequent customer cards, but decided to pare everything down to a slimmer bifold. I only carry incidental cash and three cards with me: driver's license, SU ID, and debit card.
6. Amazon Kindle
Carrying one e-book is clearly better than lugging around a bunch of books. The electronic ink is nice and easy on the eyes, but it can be a pain in the ass since coffee shops insist on having dim lighting.
The version I have is a bit older. I'll upgrade when e-books can allow you to flip through pages very quickly.
7. (Not Pictured) Apple iPhone 4
The beautiful thing about having a Kindle and a smartphone is that I always have access to information. That means that I can take advantage of time that would normally be wasted. I can read while waiting for an appointment, or waiting in line, or in between classes. With a smartphone, I can do this without carrying anything else. I have Kindle, Dropbox, and Feedly on my phone, so I have access to all of my books, journal articles, and RSS feed.
I'm currently due for an upgrade, but I haven't decided if I want to stick with Apple or switch to an Android phone like the Samsung Galaxy.
What are Intuitions? Part Two
In my last post about intuitions, I made a distinction
between conventional intuition, i.e.
a cognitive process that allows us to make split second assessments of
situations based on the information that we’ve gained over years of prior
experience, and rational insight,
i.e. a cognitive process that forms beliefs about a set of claims, which
includes beliefs about claims made in math and logic.
In this post I’d like to say more about rational
insight. Much of what I’ll say here
comes from George Bealer’s work.
However, I deviate a bit from his own views of intuitions. Bealer makes five identifying remarks about intuitions.
1. Phenemonology
Rational insight analogous to sense experience. It has its own kind of experience. In fact, I hold that there are three different types of experiences. First, there are sense experiences. Second, there are introspective experiences. These are the kinds of experiences of your own mental states. For example, the experience of an emotion like sadness fits under this category of introspective experience.
The third kind of experience is the experience brought about by rational insight. This sort of experience is what you have when a particular claim just seems true to you, and this "seeming" can't be reduced to other forms of experience. This sort of experience typically applies to claims in the foundations of mathematics and logic. This sorts of claims come with their own kind of experience. They "seem" true in a way that's analogous to how there seems to be a tree in front of us, or how we seem to feel pain.
This is probably the most important point about rational insight. My argument supporting the role that rational insight plays in epistemic justification will depend on its relevant similarity to other forms of experience.
2. A Prioricity
The term "a priori" is used for a certain kind of knowledge. It's knowledge that you arrive at by certain means. A priori knowledge is knowledge that's gained independently of experience. This is opposed to a posteriori knowledge which is knowledge gained by means of experience.
This definition of a priori creates a bit of a problem, though. If rational insight, introspection, and sense perception exhaust all of the possible kinds of knowledge (memory and testimony being derivative of these forms), and if they are all forms of experience, then there is no a priori knowledge. So, either we'd have to accept that there is no a priori/a posteriori distinction (which is fine with lots of people), or we'd have to redefine what a priori knowledge is. Maybe you can say that it's knowledge gained independently of sense experience, and that a posteriori knowledge is knowledge gained by means of sense experience. But that still leaves us with the question of how to treat knowledge gained by introspection.
Bealer holds that knowledge gained by rational insight is a priori knowledge. I'm fine with this, I guess. It doesn't matter to me either way. For my purposes, it doesn't matter if knowledge gained via rational insight is a priori or a posteriori.
3. Distinctness from Belief
Bealer holds that rational insight is not a form of belief. I agree. Rational insight is a what I call an "epistemic faculty." It is a means by which we receive information, and that information gives rise to belief. This is true also of sense perception and introspection. These comprise the three epistemic faculties. All of our information comes via these faculties. However, this information is not the same as belief. We know this to be true because there are times when we receive information, but don't believe what we receive. If I know that I'm under the influence of some hallucinogenic, then I might receive some information via sense perception that there is a unicorn in front of me, but I won't believe that there is a unicorn.
Likewise, sometimes we might receive information via rational insight, but we might refuse to form a belief based on that information. Because of this distinction, rational insight is not a form of belief, but instead an epistemic faculty, i.e. a means by which we receive information.
4. Distinctness from Common Sense
The distinction that Bealer makes here is the same distinction that I made in my earlier post between conventional intuition and rational insight.
5. Fallibility
This aspect is related to what I've said above about the distinction between an epistemic faculty and belief. Epistemic faculties aren't always going to give us good information. They might malfunction, be defective, or work in misleading situations (like when a white ball is shown under red light). Because of this, we shouldn't think that rational insight is always going to tell which claims are true. Sometimes we can have false beliefs because of the bad information received via epistemic faculties like rational insight.
So, hopefully this gives you a fairly good idea of what intuitions are. The bottom line is that the kind of intuition that I'm interested in, i.e. rational insight, is something that's very similar to sense perception. But, instead instead of perceiving physical objects in the world around us, rational insight "perceives" the truth of more abstract claims.
Likewise, sometimes we might receive information via rational insight, but we might refuse to form a belief based on that information. Because of this distinction, rational insight is not a form of belief, but instead an epistemic faculty, i.e. a means by which we receive information.
4. Distinctness from Common Sense
The distinction that Bealer makes here is the same distinction that I made in my earlier post between conventional intuition and rational insight.
5. Fallibility
This aspect is related to what I've said above about the distinction between an epistemic faculty and belief. Epistemic faculties aren't always going to give us good information. They might malfunction, be defective, or work in misleading situations (like when a white ball is shown under red light). Because of this, we shouldn't think that rational insight is always going to tell which claims are true. Sometimes we can have false beliefs because of the bad information received via epistemic faculties like rational insight.
So, hopefully this gives you a fairly good idea of what intuitions are. The bottom line is that the kind of intuition that I'm interested in, i.e. rational insight, is something that's very similar to sense perception. But, instead instead of perceiving physical objects in the world around us, rational insight "perceives" the truth of more abstract claims.
Friday, November 15, 2013
What are Intuitions? Part One
As you might recall, my dissertation is on the epistemology of metaphysics. In part of this dissertation, I talk about how intuitions play a role in giving an individual prima facie justified beliefs in metaphysical propositions. I thought I'd write a bit here about what intuitions are supposed to be.
People use the word "intuition" in lots of ways. By my reckoning, I take there to be two broad ways of understanding the term.
The first, and more common way that this term is used is to refer to a way of thinking that is fast and to some extent non-rational. This form of intuition may be considered to be a species of memory. It is the mind's way of recalling and packaging information very quickly so as to give the thinker a very quick reaction to some stimulus. For instance, and experienced soldier might take a quick look at an area and form the belief that ambush lies ahead. This belief is formed through rapid series of cognitive processes where the mind processes lots of relevant information about similar past situations. When people talk about conventional wisdom, common sense, gut reactions and such, they are referring to this kind of intuition. Malcolm Gladwell, in his book Blink, and Daniel Kahneman, in his book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, provide extensive discussions about this type of thinking. This type of intuition I'll call "conventional intuition."
The second form of intuition is what Laurence Bonjour calls "rational insight." I hold that this is an altogether different cognitive process than conventional intuition. This is a process that allows us to "see" the truth of axiomatic claims. For instance, the law of contradiction "seems" true to us. Foundational principles in logic and mathematics are the sorts of things that are the object of rational insight. Just like we see trees or cars and form the belief that there are trees and cars, we "see" the truth of these sorts of claims in math and logic and form the belief that these claims are true.
I think there's a lot of wrongheaded debate in philosophy because people either conflate these notions, or confuse one for the other. But, sometimes things get a little tricky. As I'll discuss in a later post, it may not be clear whether a particular claim is appropriately an object of conventional intuition or an object of rational insight. People who write about intuition (like George Bealer) make the division by arguing that rational insight only applies to stuff related to math and logic. I don't think this is quite right. Part of my project, then, will be to argue for a different way of understanding rational insight so as to make it more inclusive. This allows for intuition to be a source of justification for beliefs in metaphysical propositions.
But, more on rational insight later.
People use the word "intuition" in lots of ways. By my reckoning, I take there to be two broad ways of understanding the term.
The first, and more common way that this term is used is to refer to a way of thinking that is fast and to some extent non-rational. This form of intuition may be considered to be a species of memory. It is the mind's way of recalling and packaging information very quickly so as to give the thinker a very quick reaction to some stimulus. For instance, and experienced soldier might take a quick look at an area and form the belief that ambush lies ahead. This belief is formed through rapid series of cognitive processes where the mind processes lots of relevant information about similar past situations. When people talk about conventional wisdom, common sense, gut reactions and such, they are referring to this kind of intuition. Malcolm Gladwell, in his book Blink, and Daniel Kahneman, in his book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, provide extensive discussions about this type of thinking. This type of intuition I'll call "conventional intuition."
The second form of intuition is what Laurence Bonjour calls "rational insight." I hold that this is an altogether different cognitive process than conventional intuition. This is a process that allows us to "see" the truth of axiomatic claims. For instance, the law of contradiction "seems" true to us. Foundational principles in logic and mathematics are the sorts of things that are the object of rational insight. Just like we see trees or cars and form the belief that there are trees and cars, we "see" the truth of these sorts of claims in math and logic and form the belief that these claims are true.
I think there's a lot of wrongheaded debate in philosophy because people either conflate these notions, or confuse one for the other. But, sometimes things get a little tricky. As I'll discuss in a later post, it may not be clear whether a particular claim is appropriately an object of conventional intuition or an object of rational insight. People who write about intuition (like George Bealer) make the division by arguing that rational insight only applies to stuff related to math and logic. I don't think this is quite right. Part of my project, then, will be to argue for a different way of understanding rational insight so as to make it more inclusive. This allows for intuition to be a source of justification for beliefs in metaphysical propositions.
But, more on rational insight later.
Sunday, November 10, 2013
How do you talk about fiction?
I recently attended a book club meeting here in Syracuse. It was my second visit, and the book under discussion was I Am No One You Know, a collection of short stories by Joyce Carol Oates.
The meeting was okay, but largely dissatisfying. Most participants expressed their approval or disapproval of the book and left it at that. There really wasn't much probing as to why people either liked or disliked the book. Most disliked it. Reasons given as to why they didn't like it appealed to aesthetic or moral sensibilities. (The stories are very dark, touching on issues like rape, molestation, murder, loneliness, etc.)
This made me wonder about how we discuss fiction. How are you supposed to talk about fiction? What sorts of questions do you ask? Talking about most non-fiction seems relatively straightforward. Are the author's claims true? Are the author's arguments sound? (i.e. Are the premises true and is the argument form either valid or inductively strong?) These questions seem inappropriate when directed towards works of fiction? So what do we ask?
I have the same problems when trying to talk about art, poetry, film, music, theater, or dance. What more can I say, other than I liked it or disliked it? Here are several possible directions.
First, you can always talk about what happened in the book, but these questions are mainly for clarification. They serve to clear any confusions about plot. They don't really make for much discussion.
The second route is to discuss more technical aspects of the book. This would include discussing elements of style, narrative, character development, plot structure, etc. I'm guessing that discussions of this sort revolve around the aesthetics of writing. These discussions seem largely academic. You'd have to know a good deal about writing techniques in order to make informed judgments about how well executed a book is.
Third, a group can speculate on the nature or purpose of a story. Is the author promoting some sort of ideology? Are there norms that are reinforced or subverted? Is there a "lesson" or "moral" of the story? Sometimes the moral perspective of a story is easy to spot. Often there will be multiple perspectives, either embodied in different characters, or instantiated in the same character at different points in the story. Sometimes the perspective can be difficult to spot, and perhaps projected onto a story that may not have intended to promote any kind of worldview.
I have little to no knowledge about literary criticism. But I'm guessing that it involves some combination of the second and third types of book discussion.
Fourth is what might be the most personal form of discussion. Many stories, especially in literary fiction, are explorations in phenomenology. (Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience.) People tend to enjoy reading certain stories because something about the story resonates with them. This could be the way in which the author describes points of view and other psychological details. It could also be the way in which important characters develop over the course of the story. My guess is that when people say that like or don't like a book, it's probably because of reasons that fall into this category. Being able to participate in this form of discussion in any substantive way will require a good bit of self-awareness and the willingness to engage in some non-trivial self-disclosure.
So, unless there are other forms of discussion that I'm overlooking, book club discussions can either involve literary criticism or self-disclosure. Most lay folk are probably not informed enough to do the former, and a typical book club may not have gotten to the level of intimacy to the latter in any meaningful way. This is my guess as to why book club discussions seem dissatisfying on average.
The meeting was okay, but largely dissatisfying. Most participants expressed their approval or disapproval of the book and left it at that. There really wasn't much probing as to why people either liked or disliked the book. Most disliked it. Reasons given as to why they didn't like it appealed to aesthetic or moral sensibilities. (The stories are very dark, touching on issues like rape, molestation, murder, loneliness, etc.)
This made me wonder about how we discuss fiction. How are you supposed to talk about fiction? What sorts of questions do you ask? Talking about most non-fiction seems relatively straightforward. Are the author's claims true? Are the author's arguments sound? (i.e. Are the premises true and is the argument form either valid or inductively strong?) These questions seem inappropriate when directed towards works of fiction? So what do we ask?
I have the same problems when trying to talk about art, poetry, film, music, theater, or dance. What more can I say, other than I liked it or disliked it? Here are several possible directions.
First, you can always talk about what happened in the book, but these questions are mainly for clarification. They serve to clear any confusions about plot. They don't really make for much discussion.
The second route is to discuss more technical aspects of the book. This would include discussing elements of style, narrative, character development, plot structure, etc. I'm guessing that discussions of this sort revolve around the aesthetics of writing. These discussions seem largely academic. You'd have to know a good deal about writing techniques in order to make informed judgments about how well executed a book is.
Third, a group can speculate on the nature or purpose of a story. Is the author promoting some sort of ideology? Are there norms that are reinforced or subverted? Is there a "lesson" or "moral" of the story? Sometimes the moral perspective of a story is easy to spot. Often there will be multiple perspectives, either embodied in different characters, or instantiated in the same character at different points in the story. Sometimes the perspective can be difficult to spot, and perhaps projected onto a story that may not have intended to promote any kind of worldview.
I have little to no knowledge about literary criticism. But I'm guessing that it involves some combination of the second and third types of book discussion.
Fourth is what might be the most personal form of discussion. Many stories, especially in literary fiction, are explorations in phenomenology. (Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience.) People tend to enjoy reading certain stories because something about the story resonates with them. This could be the way in which the author describes points of view and other psychological details. It could also be the way in which important characters develop over the course of the story. My guess is that when people say that like or don't like a book, it's probably because of reasons that fall into this category. Being able to participate in this form of discussion in any substantive way will require a good bit of self-awareness and the willingness to engage in some non-trivial self-disclosure.
So, unless there are other forms of discussion that I'm overlooking, book club discussions can either involve literary criticism or self-disclosure. Most lay folk are probably not informed enough to do the former, and a typical book club may not have gotten to the level of intimacy to the latter in any meaningful way. This is my guess as to why book club discussions seem dissatisfying on average.
Monday, November 4, 2013
What is education?
Having been a part of the American education system in some capacity for 25 or so years, I am often presented with many opportunities to reflect on education.
What is education? Broadly construed - I like starting with broad definitions - education is a process by which knowledge is transferred from one party to another. Given this very broad definition, lots of things can count as education, and that's as I think it should be. Anytime some individual or entity passes on knowledge to another individual or entity, you have education going on.
Now, there are different sorts of knowledge. In education, I take it that two types of knowledge are transferred. First is "know-how" knowledge. This is knowing how to do perform a particular task, like riding a bike, playing the violin, or baking a cake. The other type of knowledge is propositional knowledge. This is knowledge of facts. It is also called "know-that" knowledge. These two types of knowledge are distinct. I can know facts about playing the piano without being able to play the piano. Likewise, I might be able to play the piano without ever learning the facts about what piano playing amounts to.
Alrighty, so the positive claim that there all sorts of different kinds of education going on in every society is clearly uncontentious. What's more interesting is the normative aspect of education. What kind of education is good? Is society morally obligated to educate its members? If so, how?
Let's consider the institute of education in American culture. By "institute" I mean some kind of social structure that plays a role in forming, changing, or reinforcing culture. What is the function of the institute of American education? What sorts of knowledge should American education pass on?
This is clearly an important question to answer, since we cannot evaluate the success of American education without first establishing what it is supposed to accomplish. But, before we can answer, we'll need provide further clarifications.
What is education? Broadly construed - I like starting with broad definitions - education is a process by which knowledge is transferred from one party to another. Given this very broad definition, lots of things can count as education, and that's as I think it should be. Anytime some individual or entity passes on knowledge to another individual or entity, you have education going on.
Now, there are different sorts of knowledge. In education, I take it that two types of knowledge are transferred. First is "know-how" knowledge. This is knowing how to do perform a particular task, like riding a bike, playing the violin, or baking a cake. The other type of knowledge is propositional knowledge. This is knowledge of facts. It is also called "know-that" knowledge. These two types of knowledge are distinct. I can know facts about playing the piano without being able to play the piano. Likewise, I might be able to play the piano without ever learning the facts about what piano playing amounts to.
Alrighty, so the positive claim that there all sorts of different kinds of education going on in every society is clearly uncontentious. What's more interesting is the normative aspect of education. What kind of education is good? Is society morally obligated to educate its members? If so, how?
Let's consider the institute of education in American culture. By "institute" I mean some kind of social structure that plays a role in forming, changing, or reinforcing culture. What is the function of the institute of American education? What sorts of knowledge should American education pass on?
This is clearly an important question to answer, since we cannot evaluate the success of American education without first establishing what it is supposed to accomplish. But, before we can answer, we'll need provide further clarifications.
Sunday, November 3, 2013
Friday, November 1, 2013
The relationship between culture and technology
I discussed previously what I understood culture and technology to be. I'm mainly interested in how the two are related. But what does this mean? What sorts of relations are we talking about?
The relation between the two that interests me is causal. Does technology cause changes in culture? If so, how? Likewise, does culture cause changes in technology?
I said culture is comprised of both positive and normative beliefs. It's unsurprising that technology causes changes in our positive beliefs. After the invention of the telescope, we believe that the surface of the Moon is uneven, as opposed to being perfectly spherical. More interesting is whether technology causes changes in our normative beliefs. Does technology, either directly or indirectly via positive beliefs, change what a society believes to moral, good, or beautiful? If so, how?
Here's a minor example. Suppose you're meeting up with a friend. Before cell phones and pagers, there was no way to get in touch with your friend once they were on their way to meet with you. If you were late, your friend would just have to sit their and wait without knowing what was going on. Now, if you're running late, you can always send over a text letting your friend know that you're behind schedule. It seems that this change in technology may have caused a change in our norms. It seems that the ability to keep individuals updated has made them more tolerant of tardiness, whereas they may have been less tolerant of this behavior in the past. Furthermore, not only are some tolerant, they think that it's within accepted social norms to be late to certain functions as long as you inform others of your delay.
I'm also interested in the other direction of this relationship. Again, it seems clear how our positive beliefs affect changes in technology. Discoveries in quantum mechanics paved the for technologies such as the transistor. The more interesting relation is between our normative beliefs and advancement of technology. Do our beliefs regarding what is good, moral, or beautiful play a causal role in determining the trajectory of technological development?
Here's an example in bioethics. It seems that our beliefs about what is morally permissible play a causal role in determining (or preventing) technological development using stem cells. Similar sorts of moral beliefs may have an effect on determined whether cloning technology is pursued.
So yeah, there are lots of interesting questions to pursue. Usually what I'll do is mix and match certain types of technologies with certain areas of culture. I'll ask, "How has technology of type x and aspect of culture y related over time?"
The relation between the two that interests me is causal. Does technology cause changes in culture? If so, how? Likewise, does culture cause changes in technology?
I said culture is comprised of both positive and normative beliefs. It's unsurprising that technology causes changes in our positive beliefs. After the invention of the telescope, we believe that the surface of the Moon is uneven, as opposed to being perfectly spherical. More interesting is whether technology causes changes in our normative beliefs. Does technology, either directly or indirectly via positive beliefs, change what a society believes to moral, good, or beautiful? If so, how?
Here's a minor example. Suppose you're meeting up with a friend. Before cell phones and pagers, there was no way to get in touch with your friend once they were on their way to meet with you. If you were late, your friend would just have to sit their and wait without knowing what was going on. Now, if you're running late, you can always send over a text letting your friend know that you're behind schedule. It seems that this change in technology may have caused a change in our norms. It seems that the ability to keep individuals updated has made them more tolerant of tardiness, whereas they may have been less tolerant of this behavior in the past. Furthermore, not only are some tolerant, they think that it's within accepted social norms to be late to certain functions as long as you inform others of your delay.
I'm also interested in the other direction of this relationship. Again, it seems clear how our positive beliefs affect changes in technology. Discoveries in quantum mechanics paved the for technologies such as the transistor. The more interesting relation is between our normative beliefs and advancement of technology. Do our beliefs regarding what is good, moral, or beautiful play a causal role in determining the trajectory of technological development?
Here's an example in bioethics. It seems that our beliefs about what is morally permissible play a causal role in determining (or preventing) technological development using stem cells. Similar sorts of moral beliefs may have an effect on determined whether cloning technology is pursued.
So yeah, there are lots of interesting questions to pursue. Usually what I'll do is mix and match certain types of technologies with certain areas of culture. I'll ask, "How has technology of type x and aspect of culture y related over time?"
Monday, October 28, 2013
Culture and Technology: Preliminaries
I've been fascinated by the relationship between culture and technology recently. So, I've decided that it will be one of the major themes of this blog. Every so often I'll write about these two notions in an attempt to systematize their relationship.
This is my primary question:
How does technology affect culture, and vice versa?
First, my definitions of the two terms.
By 'culture' I mean both the beliefs, positive and normative, of a particular community and the ways in which those beliefs are expressed. A community can be grouped in any particular way. Positive beliefs are beliefs about purported states of affairs of the world. Examples of positive beliefs include the following:
Barack Obama was the president of the United States in 2010.
A water molecule is made of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom.
A square has four sides that are equal in length.
Normative beliefs are value-laden beliefs. They express claims regarding what is good, bad, moral, immoral, beautiful, or ugly. Here are some examples.
Nickelback is the worst band of all time.
Murder is wrong.
I should write a thank you note to my job interviewer.
This sandwich is delicious.
Here are examples of different aspects of culture.
Arts & Entertainment
Politics & Government
Religion
Education
Scholarship
Business, Economy and Industry
Public Health
Family, Relationships, and Sex
Food & Drink
Media and Communication
I think these categories exhaust all the aspects. You can get more aspects of culture by combining various categories. Do these categories exhaust the non-reducible aspects of culture? I'm not sure. I may not have enough, or too many. If I need to change things, I'll come back and revise.
My definition of culture is intentionally broad. Is it too broad? Does it all certain things to be defined as culture that really aren't culture? Maybe. But, this should work for now. If I need to tighten up the definition, I'll come back and revise.
Similarly, my definition of 'technology' is broad. Technology is any means apart from the human body itself that mankind uses to engage with the surrounding environment. As with culture, here are the different categories of technology.
Food and Drink
Transportation
Communication
Medicine
Infrastructure
Housing
Communication
Warfare
Clothing
Energy
Manufacturing
This list is surely inconclusive. I'll come back and revise if needed.
So, now I've got a working definition of culture and technology. It's time to start waxing philosophical about how these two relate.
This is my primary question:
How does technology affect culture, and vice versa?
First, my definitions of the two terms.
By 'culture' I mean both the beliefs, positive and normative, of a particular community and the ways in which those beliefs are expressed. A community can be grouped in any particular way. Positive beliefs are beliefs about purported states of affairs of the world. Examples of positive beliefs include the following:
Barack Obama was the president of the United States in 2010.
A water molecule is made of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom.
A square has four sides that are equal in length.
Normative beliefs are value-laden beliefs. They express claims regarding what is good, bad, moral, immoral, beautiful, or ugly. Here are some examples.
Nickelback is the worst band of all time.
Murder is wrong.
I should write a thank you note to my job interviewer.
This sandwich is delicious.
Here are examples of different aspects of culture.
Arts & Entertainment
Politics & Government
Religion
Education
Scholarship
Business, Economy and Industry
Public Health
Family, Relationships, and Sex
Food & Drink
Media and Communication
I think these categories exhaust all the aspects. You can get more aspects of culture by combining various categories. Do these categories exhaust the non-reducible aspects of culture? I'm not sure. I may not have enough, or too many. If I need to change things, I'll come back and revise.
My definition of culture is intentionally broad. Is it too broad? Does it all certain things to be defined as culture that really aren't culture? Maybe. But, this should work for now. If I need to tighten up the definition, I'll come back and revise.
Similarly, my definition of 'technology' is broad. Technology is any means apart from the human body itself that mankind uses to engage with the surrounding environment. As with culture, here are the different categories of technology.
Food and Drink
Transportation
Communication
Medicine
Infrastructure
Housing
Communication
Warfare
Clothing
Energy
Manufacturing
This list is surely inconclusive. I'll come back and revise if needed.
So, now I've got a working definition of culture and technology. It's time to start waxing philosophical about how these two relate.
Wednesday, October 23, 2013
My dissertation: Overview
My dissertation is about the epistemology of metaphysics.
So, what's epistemology? Epistemology is the study of knowledge, and all other related concepts. The central question in epistemology is, "What is knowledge?" Put another way, we can ask, "Under what conditions does an individual know a certain claim?" Traditionally, philosophers have thought that there were three such conditions that had to be jointly satisfied. Let's consider whether James knows that p, where 'p' stands for any particular claim, like the claim that Jimi Hendrix was born in Seattle, WA. Here are the conditions.
1. Belief
In order for James to know that p, James has to believe that p. You can't know anything if you don't believe it.
2. Truth
In order for James to know that p, p has to be true. You can't know something that's false. For instance, you can't know that Jimi Hendrix played a show at Madison Square Garden in 2011.
3. Justification
In order for James to know that p, James's belief in p has to be justified. What does this mean? For a belief to be justified, it has to have an adequate amount of "support." There are lots of theories about how a belief is supported. For instance, maybe the belief in question is supported by other beliefs that you have. An example of this would be a mathematical proof. Or, maybe the belief is produced by some kind of cognitive process that is deemed reliable. For instance, most people believe that your physical senses are reliable for the most part, so a belief that comes from the senses would be justified.
Now, there's lots of debate as to whether this is the correct analysis of knowledge. Lots of people think that this isn't enough, and that we need a few more conditions. I'm not going to get into all that for know. The concept that is most pertinent for my project is that of justification. I'll come back to this in a sec.
Let's move on to metaphysics. What is metaphysics? This is a tad bit harder to describe. Metaphysics is basically the study of reality. But wait, doesn't science study reality, too? What's the difference between metaphysics and science? There are two ways to differentiate between academic subjects. The first is by their method of inquiry. What does a subject do to acquire new information? The most familiar method is the scientific method. Other disciplines will have their own distinct method. The second is by subject matter. This is more familiar to us. Biology and chemistry share the same method, but differ on the sorts of things that they study.
So, how do metaphysics and science differ? Depending on who you ask, these subjects can differ in either method, subject matter, or both. Most agree that metaphysics and science differ with respect to subject matter. Metaphysics is about aspects of reality that are more general than the sorts of things that science gets into. For instance, the subject matter of metaphysics includes the nature of causation, properties, sameness and change, laws of nature, existence, time, space, possibility, etc.
Most metaphysicians working in colleges and universities will argue that the methods employed in metaphysics are similar to those employed in science, especially in theoretical physics. This is an open debate, however. I'll have something to say about this in my dissertation, but I'll get to it later.
Okay, now that I've said a little bit about what metaphysics and epistemology are, let me get into what my dissertation is about. Hopefully everything that I've said above made sense. If not, let me know!
In my dissertation, I will develop a theory of epistemic justification with respect to beliefs about metaphysical claims.
What are metaphysical claims? Metaphysical claims are those sorts of claims that metaphysicians investigate and debate about. Here are some examples.
1. The ability to choose freely is incompatible with the claim that all events are caused by past events and the laws of nature.
2. God does not exist.
3. Past and future events exist in the same way as the present moment exists.
4. Causation isn't "real." That is, causation is just patterns that we observe.
5. Abstract objects, like numbers, exist, just like concrete objects exist.
I gave a brief explanation above what epistemic justification is all about. What I'll be doing in my dissertation is coming up with a way of understanding how beliefs about these kinds of claims can be justified, i.e. rationally supported. What does this theory look like? I'll get into the different parts of it in later posts.
So, what's epistemology? Epistemology is the study of knowledge, and all other related concepts. The central question in epistemology is, "What is knowledge?" Put another way, we can ask, "Under what conditions does an individual know a certain claim?" Traditionally, philosophers have thought that there were three such conditions that had to be jointly satisfied. Let's consider whether James knows that p, where 'p' stands for any particular claim, like the claim that Jimi Hendrix was born in Seattle, WA. Here are the conditions.
1. Belief
In order for James to know that p, James has to believe that p. You can't know anything if you don't believe it.
2. Truth
In order for James to know that p, p has to be true. You can't know something that's false. For instance, you can't know that Jimi Hendrix played a show at Madison Square Garden in 2011.
3. Justification
In order for James to know that p, James's belief in p has to be justified. What does this mean? For a belief to be justified, it has to have an adequate amount of "support." There are lots of theories about how a belief is supported. For instance, maybe the belief in question is supported by other beliefs that you have. An example of this would be a mathematical proof. Or, maybe the belief is produced by some kind of cognitive process that is deemed reliable. For instance, most people believe that your physical senses are reliable for the most part, so a belief that comes from the senses would be justified.
Now, there's lots of debate as to whether this is the correct analysis of knowledge. Lots of people think that this isn't enough, and that we need a few more conditions. I'm not going to get into all that for know. The concept that is most pertinent for my project is that of justification. I'll come back to this in a sec.
Let's move on to metaphysics. What is metaphysics? This is a tad bit harder to describe. Metaphysics is basically the study of reality. But wait, doesn't science study reality, too? What's the difference between metaphysics and science? There are two ways to differentiate between academic subjects. The first is by their method of inquiry. What does a subject do to acquire new information? The most familiar method is the scientific method. Other disciplines will have their own distinct method. The second is by subject matter. This is more familiar to us. Biology and chemistry share the same method, but differ on the sorts of things that they study.
So, how do metaphysics and science differ? Depending on who you ask, these subjects can differ in either method, subject matter, or both. Most agree that metaphysics and science differ with respect to subject matter. Metaphysics is about aspects of reality that are more general than the sorts of things that science gets into. For instance, the subject matter of metaphysics includes the nature of causation, properties, sameness and change, laws of nature, existence, time, space, possibility, etc.
Most metaphysicians working in colleges and universities will argue that the methods employed in metaphysics are similar to those employed in science, especially in theoretical physics. This is an open debate, however. I'll have something to say about this in my dissertation, but I'll get to it later.
Okay, now that I've said a little bit about what metaphysics and epistemology are, let me get into what my dissertation is about. Hopefully everything that I've said above made sense. If not, let me know!
In my dissertation, I will develop a theory of epistemic justification with respect to beliefs about metaphysical claims.
What are metaphysical claims? Metaphysical claims are those sorts of claims that metaphysicians investigate and debate about. Here are some examples.
1. The ability to choose freely is incompatible with the claim that all events are caused by past events and the laws of nature.
2. God does not exist.
3. Past and future events exist in the same way as the present moment exists.
4. Causation isn't "real." That is, causation is just patterns that we observe.
5. Abstract objects, like numbers, exist, just like concrete objects exist.
I gave a brief explanation above what epistemic justification is all about. What I'll be doing in my dissertation is coming up with a way of understanding how beliefs about these kinds of claims can be justified, i.e. rationally supported. What does this theory look like? I'll get into the different parts of it in later posts.
What this blog is about
Ultimately this blog is about me trying to write as much as possible. What I write will more or less fall into these categories.
1. Philosophy and dissertation related stuff.
Nothing that I write here will presuppose any background knowledge in philosophy. My goal is to be able to communicate my own research in a manner that is accessible without overly distorting or caricaturing the content. Click here for an overview of what my dissertation is about.
2. Culture and technology
I think a lot about culture, and the way that technology affects culture, and vice versa. A lot of what I post here will be my reflections on this relationship. Click here before you start reading the other stuff on culture and technology.
3. Pedagogy
I like to teach. I like to think that I'm good at it, but I'm certainly nowhere near as good as I should be. Sometimes I'll post on my thoughts on teaching and how I could be better at it.
4. Thoughts on stuff that I read.
A lot of my posts will be links to interesting things that I come across online. Every now and then I'll post reflections on the books that I read.
5. Personal stuff
This blog will not be a "diary" as the word is normally understood. However, once in a blue moon I might post thoughts and reflections on topics of a more personal nature. This is only place on the internet where I feel that I can safely write these things.
If you're reading this blog, you probably know me in person. If you do know me, or even if you don't, please help me by providing as many questions, comments, or objections as you can. This will provide me with further incentive to write. I promise that I will try to answer every serious comment that I receive.
Also, if you're curious, the name of this blog is "Gnothi Seauton," which is translated "Know Thyself." The phrase is inscribed in the Temple of Apollos at Delphi.
If you're reading this blog, you probably know me in person. If you do know me, or even if you don't, please help me by providing as many questions, comments, or objections as you can. This will provide me with further incentive to write. I promise that I will try to answer every serious comment that I receive.
Also, if you're curious, the name of this blog is "Gnothi Seauton," which is translated "Know Thyself." The phrase is inscribed in the Temple of Apollos at Delphi.