My EDC Photo

"EDC" stands for "Every Day Carry."  Here's my photo.




I'll go clockwise starting from my bag.

1. Fossil Emerson Messenger Bag
I found this at the mall and it was tagged at $148.  The bag was on sale for a 30% discount, so that brought the price down to about $100 before tax.  I find out later that the bag was mis-tagged and that the real price was $250.  I don't know if there's a word for the opposite of buyer's regret, but that most certainly applies in this case.  Love this bag.

Aside from what's on the table, what I keep in my bag includes books that are not available in Kindle format, pens, teaching paperwork, and occasionally my laptop.  I don't generally carry my laptop unless I intend on writing somewhere other than home.

2. Sony MDR-NC200D Noise Cancelling Headphones
If I'm out and about and I want to read and/or write, these headphones are a must.  I get easily distracted by the music and conversations around me.

3. Dry Erase Markers
Classrooms never seem to have dry erase markers that work, so I carry some with me just in case.

4. Keys
House keys, car keys, and a keychain bottle opener.

5. Saddleback Leather Bifold Wallet
I used to have a trifold wallet filled with all kinds of frequent customer cards, but decided to pare everything down to a slimmer bifold.  I only carry incidental cash and three cards with me: driver's license, SU ID, and debit card. 

6. Amazon Kindle
Carrying one e-book is clearly better than lugging around a bunch of books.  The electronic ink is nice and easy on the eyes, but it can be a pain in the ass since coffee shops insist on having dim lighting.

The version I have is a bit older.  I'll upgrade when e-books can allow you to flip through pages very quickly.

7. (Not Pictured)  Apple iPhone 4
The beautiful thing about having a Kindle and a smartphone is that I always have access to information.  That means that I can take advantage of time that would normally be wasted.  I can read while waiting for an appointment, or waiting in line, or in between classes.  With a smartphone, I can do this without carrying anything else.  I have Kindle, Dropbox, and Feedly on my phone, so I have access to all of my books, journal articles, and RSS feed. 

I'm currently due for an upgrade, but I haven't decided if I want to stick with Apple or switch to an Android phone like the Samsung Galaxy.

What are Intuitions? Part Two

In my last post about intuitions, I made a distinction between conventional intuition, i.e. a cognitive process that allows us to make split second assessments of situations based on the information that we’ve gained over years of prior experience, and rational insight, i.e. a cognitive process that forms beliefs about a set of claims, which includes beliefs about claims made in math and logic.

In this post I’d like to say more about rational insight.  Much of what I’ll say here comes from George Bealer’s work.  However, I deviate a bit from his own views of intuitions.  Bealer makes five identifying remarks about intuitions.

1.  Phenemonology

Rational insight analogous to sense experience.  It has its own kind of experience.  In fact, I hold that there are three different types of experiences.  First, there are sense experiences.  Second, there are introspective experiences.  These are the kinds of experiences of your own mental states.  For example, the experience of an emotion like sadness fits under this category of introspective experience.

The third kind of experience is the experience brought about by rational insight.  This sort of experience is what you have when a particular claim just seems true to you, and this "seeming" can't be reduced to other forms of experience.  This sort of experience typically applies to claims in the foundations of mathematics and logic.  This sorts of claims come with their own kind of experience.  They "seem" true in a way that's analogous to how there seems to be a tree in front of us, or how we seem to feel pain.

This is probably the most important point about rational insight.  My argument supporting the role that rational insight plays in epistemic justification will depend on its relevant similarity to other forms of experience.

2. A Prioricity

The term "a priori" is used for a certain kind of knowledge.  It's knowledge that you arrive at by certain means.  A priori knowledge is knowledge that's gained independently of experience.  This is opposed to a posteriori knowledge which is knowledge gained by means of experience.

This definition of a priori creates a bit of a problem, though.  If rational insight, introspection, and sense perception exhaust all of the possible kinds of knowledge (memory and testimony being derivative of these forms), and if they are all forms of experience, then there is no a priori knowledge.  So, either we'd have to accept that there is no a priori/a posteriori distinction (which is fine with lots of people), or we'd have to redefine what a priori knowledge is.  Maybe you can say that it's knowledge gained independently of sense experience, and that a posteriori knowledge is knowledge gained by means of sense experience.  But that still leaves us with the question of how to treat knowledge gained by introspection.

Bealer holds that knowledge gained by rational insight is a priori knowledge.  I'm fine with this, I guess.  It doesn't matter to me either way.  For my purposes, it doesn't matter if knowledge gained via rational insight is a priori or a posteriori.

3. Distinctness from Belief

Bealer holds that rational insight is not a form of belief.  I agree.  Rational insight is a what I call an "epistemic faculty."  It is a means by which we receive information, and that information gives rise to belief.  This is true also of sense perception and introspection.  These comprise the three epistemic faculties.  All of our information comes via these faculties.  However, this information is not the same as belief.  We know this to be true because there are times when we receive information, but don't believe what we receive.  If I know that I'm under the influence of some hallucinogenic, then I might receive some information via sense perception that there is a unicorn in front of me, but I won't believe that there is a unicorn.

Likewise, sometimes we might receive information via rational insight, but we might refuse to form a belief based on that information.  Because of this distinction, rational insight is not a form of belief, but instead an epistemic faculty, i.e. a means by which we receive information.

4. Distinctness from Common Sense
The distinction that Bealer makes here is the same distinction that I made in my earlier post between conventional intuition and rational insight.

5. Fallibility
This aspect is related to what I've said above about the distinction between an epistemic faculty and belief.  Epistemic faculties aren't always going to give us good information.  They might malfunction, be defective, or work in misleading situations (like when a white ball is shown under red light).  Because of this, we shouldn't think that rational insight is always going to tell which claims are true.  Sometimes we can have false beliefs because of the bad information received via epistemic faculties like rational insight.

So, hopefully this gives you a fairly good idea of what intuitions are.  The bottom line is that the kind of intuition that I'm interested in, i.e. rational insight, is something that's very similar to sense perception.  But, instead instead of perceiving physical objects in the world around us, rational insight "perceives" the truth of more abstract claims.

What are Intuitions? Part One

As you might recall, my dissertation is on the epistemology of metaphysics.  In part of this dissertation, I talk about how intuitions play a role in giving an individual prima facie justified beliefs in metaphysical propositions.  I thought I'd write a bit here about what intuitions are supposed to be.

People use the word "intuition" in lots of ways.  By my reckoning, I take there to be two broad ways of understanding the term.

The first, and more common way that this term is used is to refer to a way of thinking that is fast and to some extent non-rational.  This form of intuition may be considered to be a species of memory.  It is the mind's way of recalling and packaging information very quickly so as to give the thinker a very quick reaction to some stimulus.  For instance, and experienced soldier might take a quick look at an area and form the belief that ambush lies ahead.  This belief is formed through rapid series of cognitive processes where the mind processes lots of relevant information about similar past situations.  When people talk about conventional wisdom, common sense, gut reactions and such, they are referring to this kind of intuition.  Malcolm Gladwell, in his book Blink, and Daniel Kahneman, in his book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, provide extensive discussions about this type of thinking.  This type of intuition I'll call "conventional intuition."

The second form of intuition is what Laurence Bonjour calls "rational insight."  I hold that this is an altogether different cognitive process than conventional intuition.  This is a process that allows us to "see" the truth of axiomatic claims.  For instance, the law of contradiction "seems" true to us.  Foundational principles in logic and mathematics are the sorts of things that are the object of rational insight.  Just like we see trees or cars and form the belief that there are trees and cars, we "see" the truth of these sorts of claims in math and logic and form the belief that these claims are true.

I think there's a lot of wrongheaded debate in philosophy because people either conflate these notions, or confuse one for the other.  But, sometimes things get a little tricky.  As I'll discuss in a later post, it may not be clear whether a particular claim is appropriately an object of conventional intuition or an object of rational insight.  People who write about intuition (like George Bealer) make the division by arguing that rational insight only applies to stuff related to math and logic.  I don't think this is quite right.  Part of my project, then, will be to argue for a different way of understanding rational insight so as to make it more inclusive.  This allows for intuition to be a source of justification for beliefs in metaphysical propositions.

But, more on rational insight later.

How do you talk about fiction?

I recently attended a book club meeting here in Syracuse.  It was my second visit, and the book under discussion was I Am No One You Know, a collection of short stories by Joyce Carol Oates.

The meeting was okay, but largely dissatisfying.  Most participants expressed their approval or disapproval of the book and left it at that.  There really wasn't much probing as to why people either liked or disliked the book.  Most disliked it.  Reasons given as to why they didn't like it appealed to aesthetic or moral sensibilities.  (The stories are very dark, touching on issues like rape, molestation, murder, loneliness, etc.)

This made me wonder about how we discuss fiction.  How are you supposed to talk about fiction?  What sorts of questions do you ask?  Talking about most non-fiction seems relatively straightforward.  Are the author's claims true?  Are the author's arguments sound?  (i.e. Are the premises true and is the argument form either valid or inductively strong?)  These questions seem inappropriate when directed towards works of fiction?  So what do we ask?

I have the same problems when trying to talk about art, poetry, film, music, theater, or dance.  What more can I say, other than I liked it or disliked it?  Here are several possible directions.

First, you can always talk about what happened in the book, but these questions are mainly for clarification.  They serve to clear any confusions about plot.  They don't really make for much discussion.

The second route is to discuss more technical aspects of the book.  This would include discussing elements of style, narrative, character development, plot structure, etc.  I'm guessing that discussions of this sort revolve around the aesthetics of writing.  These discussions seem largely academic.  You'd have to know a good deal about writing techniques in order to make informed judgments about how well executed a book is.

Third, a group can speculate on the nature or purpose of a story.  Is the author promoting some sort of ideology?  Are there norms that are reinforced or subverted?  Is there a "lesson" or "moral" of the story?  Sometimes the moral perspective of a story is easy to spot.  Often there will be multiple perspectives, either embodied in different characters, or instantiated in the same character at different points in the story.  Sometimes the perspective can be difficult to spot, and perhaps projected onto a story that may not have intended to promote any kind of worldview.

I have little to no knowledge about literary criticism.  But I'm guessing that it involves some combination of the second and third types of book discussion.

Fourth is what might be the most personal form of discussion.  Many stories, especially in literary fiction, are explorations in phenomenology. (Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience.)  People tend to enjoy reading certain stories because something about the story resonates with them.  This could be the way in which the author describes points of view and other psychological details.  It could also be the way in which important characters develop over the course of the story.  My guess is that when people say that like or don't like a book, it's probably because of reasons that fall into this category.  Being able to participate in this form of discussion in any substantive way will require a good bit of self-awareness and the willingness to engage in some non-trivial self-disclosure.

So, unless there are other forms of discussion that I'm overlooking, book club discussions can either involve literary criticism or self-disclosure.  Most lay folk are probably not informed enough to do the former, and a typical book club may not have gotten to the level of intimacy to the latter in any meaningful way.  This is my guess as to why book club discussions seem dissatisfying on average.

What is education?

Having been a part of the American education system in some capacity for 25 or so years, I am often presented with many opportunities to reflect on education.

What is education?  Broadly construed - I like starting with broad definitions - education is a process by which knowledge is transferred from one party to another.  Given this very broad definition, lots of things can count as education, and that's as I think it should be.  Anytime some individual or entity passes on knowledge to another individual or entity, you have education going on.

Now, there are different sorts of knowledge.  In education, I take it that two types of knowledge are transferred.  First is "know-how" knowledge.  This is knowing how to do perform a particular task, like riding a bike, playing the violin, or baking a cake.  The other type of knowledge is propositional knowledge.  This is knowledge of facts.  It is also called "know-that" knowledge.  These two types of knowledge are distinct.  I can know facts about playing the piano without being able to play the piano.  Likewise, I might be able to play the piano without ever learning the facts about what piano playing amounts to.

Alrighty, so the positive claim that there all sorts of different kinds of education going on in every society is clearly uncontentious.  What's more interesting is the normative aspect of education.  What kind of education is good?  Is society morally obligated to educate its members?  If so, how?

Let's consider the institute of education in American culture.  By "institute" I mean some kind of social structure that plays a role in forming, changing, or reinforcing culture.  What is the function of the institute of American education?  What sorts of knowledge should American education pass on?

This is clearly an important question to answer, since we cannot evaluate the success of American education without first establishing what it is supposed to accomplish.  But, before we can answer, we'll need provide further clarifications.

Wars on Kinkaide

See more here.

The relationship between culture and technology

I discussed previously what I understood culture and technology to be.  I'm mainly interested in how the two are related.  But what does this mean?  What sorts of relations are we talking about?

The relation between the two that interests me is causal.  Does technology cause changes in culture?  If so, how?  Likewise, does culture cause changes in technology?

I said culture is comprised of both positive and normative beliefs.  It's unsurprising that technology causes changes in our positive beliefs.  After the invention of the telescope, we believe that the surface of the Moon is uneven, as opposed to being perfectly spherical.  More interesting is whether technology causes changes in our normative beliefs.  Does technology, either directly or indirectly via positive beliefs, change what a society believes to moral, good, or beautiful?  If so, how?

Here's a minor example.  Suppose you're meeting up with a friend.  Before cell phones and pagers, there was no way to get in touch with your friend once they were on their way to meet with you.  If you were late, your friend would just have to sit their and wait without knowing what was going on.  Now, if you're running late, you can always send over a text letting your friend know that you're behind schedule.  It seems that this change in technology may have caused a change in our norms.  It seems that the ability to keep individuals updated has made them more tolerant of tardiness, whereas they may have been less tolerant of this behavior in the past.  Furthermore, not only are some tolerant, they think that it's within accepted social norms to be late to certain functions as long as you inform others of your delay.

I'm also interested in the other direction of this relationship.  Again, it seems clear how our positive beliefs affect changes in technology.  Discoveries in quantum mechanics paved the for technologies such as the transistor.  The more interesting relation is between our normative beliefs and advancement of technology.  Do our beliefs regarding what is good, moral, or beautiful play a causal role in determining the trajectory of technological development?

Here's an example in bioethics.  It seems that our beliefs about what is morally permissible play a causal role in determining (or preventing) technological development using stem cells.  Similar sorts of moral beliefs may have an effect on determined whether cloning technology is pursued.

So yeah, there are lots of interesting questions to pursue.  Usually what I'll do is mix and match certain types of technologies with certain areas of culture.  I'll ask, "How has technology of type x and aspect of culture y related over time?"